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Introduction 
By Olav Riste 
The articles in this issue of Forsvarsstudier emanate from an 
international conference held in Oslo in 2005 on the topic "Intelli-
gence in Waging the Cold War: NATO, The Warsaw Pact and 
the Neutrals, 1949-1990". The conference was organised by the 
Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies and the international pro-
ject on the Parallel History of NATO and the Warsaw Pact and 
featured tWO pioneering ventures. First, as indicated by the title, 
it brought together intelligence historians from both sides of the 
Iron Curtain. Second, the organisers decided it was time for intel-
ligence historians to make a first attempt to assess the role played 
by intelligence in the overall development of the Cold War.! In 
spite of the great limitations imposed by the demands of secrecy 
- some of them perfectly reasonable, but many less so - research 
into intelligence in the Cold War has made remarkable progress 
during the last fifteen years, especially in the West. In the countries 
of the Warsaw Pact, headway has been more spasmodic, particu-
larly since the archives of the former Soviet Union remain closed 
to outsiders. 
The organisers of the conference therefore decided to challenge 
two prominent intelligence scholars to putto papertheir assessments 
of the contribution that western intelligence made to the course of 
events that we now call the Cold War. In other words, we wanted 
them to ask what John Lewis Gaddis called "that most useful of 
the historian's interrogatories: What difference did it all make?'" 
It is possible to sec this decision as n response ro John Lcwis Gaddis' challenge, 
in the somewhat rambling chapter on "Intelligence, Espionage, and Cold War 
History" in his book The United States and tIn' End of tbe Cold W'ar (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1992), that "wc know relatively little, as yet" about that 
rolc. 
2 Ibid., p. 88. 
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They approached the task from somewhat different perspectives. 
One of them, J. Kenneth McDonald, could draw on his many years 
of experience as Chief Historian of the US Central Intelligence 
Agency. The other one, Michael Herman, has had the benefit of 
a lifetime of service in British intelligence, both as a specialist in 
signals intelligence and as senior secretary in the Cabinet Office. 
For a parallel assessment from "the other side of the hill", we then 
asked Vojtech Mastny to contribute a paper - knowing, of course, 
that the general unavailability of Soviet archives made his task 
tbat much more difficult. McDonald and Mastny decided to deal 
with the topic in a fairly straigbtforward, historical way. In this 
publication we have therefore decided to lead off with Michael 
Herman's article, since bis more thematic approach may enable 
readers less familiar with the field of intelligence studies to ac-
quaint themselves with the wide spectrum of activities that intelli-
gence agencies engage in. 
When presenting the original papers at the conference, the au-
thors stressed that their assessments were necessarily of an ad hoc 
nature. But the Institute for Defence Studies felt that they could 
offcr an important and valuable "bencbmark" of what we now 
know about the place and role of intelligence in the Cold War. We 
therefore persuaded the authors to revise and expand their papers 
for publication. The resulting three articles presented here do not 
have any final answers, but they provide a number of pointers to 
help us towards answering the big question: In the power conflict 
which so dominated the second half of the twentieth century, and 
over which hung the Damoclean sword of nuclear weapons, ca-
pable of annihilating the world several times over, did intelligence 
help avoid the Cold War becoming "hot"? 
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Intelligence effects on the 
Cold War: Some reflections1 
By Michael Herman 
The Cold War was particularly an intelligence war. Soviet secrecy 
made the West especially dependent on intelligence and, despit~ 
Western openness, the Soviet regime was incapable of believing 
anything thar it had not learned hy espionage. Both sides attached 
great importance to knowing the enemy, and to intelligence's 
other, defensive role of counterintelligence, counterespionage and 
ensuring information security on its own side. 2 This struggle be-
tween the intelligence adversaries - in some ways replicas of each 
other, and in others as different as the state systems they represented 
- was conducted with unprecedented peacetime resources and 
intensity, competing to penetrate the adversary's information de-
fences while strengthening one's own. The Cold War cannot be 
imagined without this contest. 
This was to have lasting consequences. Intelligence became a 
sizeable, permanent and public institution of the modern state, 
and from this came the Western ideas of its democratic account-
ability and legal legitimacy that are now gaining worldwide cur-
rency. There were long-lasting societal effects: the modern, e1ec-
I am gmteful to Professors Danchcv, MccGwirc and Ristc for comments and suggestions. 
1 For a discussion of the connections between intelligence'S offensive and defensive 
roles sec the author's Intelligellce Power ill Peace a~ul W'ar (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), chapters 10-11. 
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tronic society owes something to the years following 1945 in which 
intelligence helped to stimulate the rapid advances in computeri-
zation, miniaturization and photography. At a more ptosaic level, 
the employment vetting that we now accept as normal started as 
British and American reactions to the Soviet espionage threat; as 
did the modern habit of wearing personalized IDs in the work-
place. 
But these wide effects are not the focus in this paper. Instead I 
consider how intelligence influenced the Cold War itself and how 
it was fought. Intelligence was an integral part of that war, but did 
it make it hotter or colder, or sway governments' decisions in anv 
systematic way? Or, despite its prominence, did it contribute more 
to the atmospherics - such as the "adversary images" - rather than 
to the actual substance? Intelligence was essentially three things: 
its activities, the knowledge it provided from them, and its power 
as a capability - in military terms, as a "force in being". I review 
its influence under these three headings, and then assess how much 
it mattered as a totality. 
But this is no more than a partial sketch of a big subject. I con-
centrate on the Western side, and within it on Britain and AUlerica, 
treating them together as "Western" without covering all the other 
members of the alliance. My judgments abour intelligence accu-
racies and inaccuracies are broad-brush, and are not argued. The 
effects considered are those of intelligence as an institution, and 
nOt the personal impact of its individual leaders. I touch on the 
Soviet side in places where each side's intelligence had reciprocal 
effects on the other, bur I do not deal with the central question 
of Soviet intelligence's influence within its own regime. Nor do 
I discuss which side "won" the intelligence war. On all counts 
- particularly the need for more comparisons of East and West 
- much more work is needed. I hope this paper will encourage it. 
Activities 
Technical Collection 
Intelligence was a major activity by each side: no one knows the 
exact manpower totals, but some years ago I estimated that the 
American effort alone (excluding its allies) may at its height have 
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involved some 200,000 staff, and the Soviet effort was even larger.3 
Each side was the other's main target: the British estimated that 
around 60-70 per cent of their effort was directed at the Soviet 
Bloc, and this did not include the indirect coverage of Soviet activi-
ties in the Third World. The pervading image of intelligence was 
of spying, yet most of the work in the West consisted of various 
forms of technical collection. (The Soviet Bluc's technical effort 
was also substantial, larger than often thought.)4 This effort includ-
ed imagery and photo-reconnaissance, whose early use of aircraft 
was eventually overtaken by the extensive American (and Soviet) 
imagery satellite programmes. But the main activity was Sigint col-
lection, overwhelming so in the West, and perhaps also trne of the 
other side. Though this Sigint also came to use space satellites, 
most of its collection remained at sizeable, fixed, terrestrial sites. 
These were not publicly declared, but could not be completely con-
cealed: the antennae conld not be submerged underground or the 
workforce hidden. Each side was well aware of the other, though 
sketchy on the details. 
The location of these sites was dictated by the realities of radio 
propagation, and these reinforced the Cold War's geo-politics. The 
princi pal classes of Soviet military transmissions could be intercepted 
at ranges of hundreds of miles, but there were difficulties if these 
got into thousands. So very few of them could be intercepted from 
the American homeland, and the United States needed Sigint bases 
nearer the USSR or arrangements with friendly services in the right 
places. Almost all America's NATO allies, including the UK, could 
provide some useful "real estate" to fulfil this requirement: even 
Canada, whose distance from Russia appears exaggerated on most 
maps, was able to contribute usefully on the Soviet Arctic. The 
same requirement applied around the southern Soviet periphery 
and Soviet Far East. Geography was also a factor in other kinds of 
technical collection, as exemplified by the British and Norwegian 
3 Scc Herman, Intelligence Power i11 Peace and War, p. 37(note). 
4 See for example Ben Fischcr, '''One of the Biggest Ears in the World': East German 
Siginr"', International journal of Intdligellce (lItd COllllterimefligence, \'01. 11, no. 
2 (summer 1998). For Soviet Sigint sec Christophcr Andrcw and Olcg Gorclicvsky, 
KGB: Tbe I11side Story of its Foreign Operations /r0111 Lenilr to Corbachw 
(London: Hoddcr and Stoughton, 1990), pp. 510-512. 
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sites used as shore ends for the American acoustic devices that de-
tected submerged Soviet submarines en route between northern 
waters and the Atlantic. 
As the Cold War developed this geographical dimension was 
additionally sharpened by the growing volume of Soviet transmis-
sions and emissions that used the higher frequency bands which 
necessitated interception at much closer range: further than line-
of-sight, but not much further. Western states that had Soviet 
forces near their borders or just over the horizon could thus offer 
particularly valuable locations. Hence the original wider ring of 
Western sites was soon complemented by an inner ring of c1ose-
access ones that included northern Norway, the Baltic area, the 
Federal Republic of Germany, northern Turkey and Iran, and 
Berlin as a prime location behind enemy lines. American technical 
intelligence needed these footholds abroad, and most of the count-
ries providing them insisted on being treated as collaborators ra-
ther than mercenaries or real estate agents. One result was to en-
courage intelligence interdependence and cooperation within the 
Western alliance as a whole, and not only in the special UK-US 
relationship. 
So the requirements of technical interception reinforced the 
Cold War's geography, of Western forces around the Soviet heart-
land looking in, and the USSR's on the inside looking out. Intel-
ligence formed part of the Soviet perception of the encircling 
Western threat. Soviet intelligence lacked comparable territory for 
collection on the American home base, except for Cuba, where its 
large Sigint station remained an irritant long after the USSR had 
ceased to exist. In the Cold War the Soviet leadership sought to 
redress this balance by using ships, aircraft and diplomatic prem-
ises, but this could only partially offset the absence of conventional 
terrestrial bases. 
Collection geography also had a bearing on the internal politics 
of the Western alliance. The intelligence dimension of the UK-
US special relationship owed something (though by no means 
everything) to the UK's position as an unsinkable aircraft carrier 
within intelligence range of the enemy. The same applied to the at-
tention paid to Norway and the Northern Flank, the value attached 
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to Turkey, and the role of Cyprus and its bearing on the politics 
of Greek-Turkish relationships. Conversely, France's lack of well-
placed sites held it back as a player in the Western intelligence 
club, and possibly contributed a little to its semi-disengaged stance 
in the alliance. 
These geographic effects extended outside NATO. The value of 
Iran as an interception site was a major factor in the American pre-
sence there, and all that followed from it after the Shah's departure. 
Japan's value as an intelligence window on to the Soviet Far East 
figured in its American relationship, and perhaps the dispute over 
the Kuriles. Australia's ability to provide ground control sites for 
American satellites became a factor in its emergence as a US ally in 
its own right, no longer tied to the British connection. Using their 
geography to make unique intelligence contributions also helped 
neutrals to align discreetly with the West. Geographic access was 
even the basis of the secret Si no-American agreement over Sigint 
operations in China against Soviet missile tests. 
This collection was all fixed and un provocative. But the need to 
get close to short-range Soviet transmissions also led the West to 
mount mobile collection from ships and aircraft where land-based 
collection was impossible or incomplete. Aircraft were also used 
where flying at height provided a deep look into the adversary's ter-
ritory for Sigint, photography, active radar and other collection. 
There were thus constant aircraft flights along Warsaw Pact bord-
ers, in international waters off the Soviet coastline, and in the sea 
areas used by the Soviet navy. One side acted, the other reacted, 
and monitoring the reaction was one of the Western intelligence ob-
jectives. Naval vessels also collected intelligence on suitable deploy-
ments, and there was some limited Western use of specialized intel-
ligence vessels that could spend lengthy periods on station. 
These operations were intensive: a multinational Great Game, 
played not only along the German border but also over and in the 
Baltic, the Barents Sea, the Sea of Okhotsk, the North Pacific and 
elsewhere. Aircraft packed with technical equipment flew every 
day, and tough men rolled for weeks on station in small ships. 
Though the US led, others played significant roles. 
Soviet collection reflected its geographical limitations: except 
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along the German border, it was difficult for Soviet aircraft to get 
close to Britain and America and their main forces. Perhaps as a 
consequence there was greater Soviet effort - much greater than in 
the West - to carry out regular patrols using specialized collection 
vessels, the so-called "intelligence trawlers"; but these were still 
quite widely dispersed around worldwide Western targets. 
Operations by both sides were all undeclared, but many of 
them wete almost overt: there was no mystety abour the regular 
"milk-runs" by Western aircraft and their tourine investigation 
by Soviet fightets. Surface vessels wete equally observable. Other 
operations were deeply covert, particularly the American sub-
marine missions to tap cables off the Soviet coast. Submarine 
operations in Soviet fleet areas sought to avoid detection, but the 
Soviets had no illusions about their existence. (As far as is known, 
the Soviet use of submarines on covert missions was confined to 
their appearances in Swedish coastal waters). Close contact of a 
quite different kind was also provided by the "licensed espionage" 
- actually observation and photography - of both sides' military 
missions in Germany and their military attaches everywhere. 
Most of this maritime and airborne collection took place in 
international airspace or over international waters or friendly ter-
ritory. Some of it was part of the demonstrative use of militarv 
power by both sides, such as the American "forward deployment;' 
in the Soviet bastion of the northern waters, and the Soviet use of 
ships and aircraft to show world reach. Some was part of the sur-
face and underwater "tailing" of the maritime Cold War. Other 
collection became accepted, even if not licensed. 
But particularly for airborne collection, the technical imperative 
of getting close to the targets made it a fragile routine, especially 
when the operations included deliberate provocation. An aircraft 
would approach low under radar cover and suddenly go high: 
or, in one American's words, "to tickle the Soviets a little and 
create more activity we would do a sttaight approach towards 
Sevastopol, turn and run out. Then we would listen to the racket 
[the communications of the Soviet air defence system]".' For the 
.) A. Price, The History oJU.s. Elecmmic Wmiare (Alexandria, VA: The Association of Old 
Crows, 1989), p. 87. 
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Soviet defenders there was always the fear of surprise American 
attack, particularly when Strategic Air Command (SAC) had 
nuclear-armed aircraft permanently airborne. 
So there was always a risk of incidents because of navigational 
miscalculations or extempore or calculated macho behaviour, parti-
cularly in states of East-West tension. More than twenty American 
aircraft were shot down betwccn 1947 and 1960;' twelve are said 
to have been collecting Sigint and some others may have been on 
other intelligence missions. A Swedish aircraft shor down over in 
1952 Over the Baltic was unquestionably an intelligence collector: 
a flying boat sent to rescue the crew was also shot down.7 There 
were also innocent civilian victims. In April 1978 a South Korean 
airliner was shot down over the north-west USSR, and the same fate 
met another which was shot down with no survivors in September 
1983 after its accidental incursion over Kamchatka. Even "licensed 
spying" had its casualties: in the strained atmosphere of 1984, an 
officer of the American military mission in East Germany was shot 
and killed.8 
Underlying the tension in these incidents there was of course the 
Soviet regime's knowledge of the deliberate American overflying 
of its territory. This included deep penetrations, initially by SAC 
aircraft in the first half of the 1950s and then by CIA's U-2s in the 
second, and also some British participation. The SAC operations 
seem to have been part of an (unauthorized) programme designed 
to combine operational reconnaissance with political pressure. 
The U-2 programme was a wholly intelligence one, principally for 
photo-reconnaissance, and comprised sOme 20 overflights until 
One was shot down deep over the Soviet Union on 1 May 1960. 
They were all detected by Soviet air defences;' and the West knew 
that the Russians knew. Over the same period nearly five hundred 
un manned American balloons were also released to drift over the 
6 P. Lashmar, Spy Flights ol tbe Cold W!ar (Stroud, Glos: Sutton, 19%), p. 171. But 
varied figures were offered earlier about the total of American aircraft shot down 
and the number of them engaged on intelligence missions. Sec Herman, I1Ite/ligel1cc 
Power ill Peace and W'ar, p. 187{note}. 
7 La:.hmar, Spy Flights of the Cold \X'ar, p. 169. 
8 Tony Geraght)', Beyond the Front Line (London: Harper CnJlins, 1996), pp. 247-8. 
9 Alexander Orlov, "The U~2 Program: A Russian Officer Remembers"', Studies ill 
Intelligence (\·.;;rashington: Ccntcr for tbe Study of Intelligence. winter 1998-1999). 
16 FORSVARSSTUDIER 112006 
USSR and record radar emISSions. There were no comparable 
Soviet intrusions of Western airspace, though the approaches of 
Soviet aircraft and intelligence vessels were regularly portrayed in 
the West as the adversary flexing his muscles. 
Espionage and Covert Action 
Extensive though all this technical collection was, it was still of 
less influence than the clandestine use of human agents. Much of 
this activity entailed intelligence collection, but as in centuries past 
it extended to covert action of all kinds. In the Soviet view the two 
were inseparable and of equal priority,IO and its effort within both 
forms was extensive. The West, however, distinguished between 
them, perhaps influenced by the Second World War division be-
tween the British SIS's intelligence gathering and the Special Ope-
rations Executive created to "set Europe ablaze".l1 It tended to see 
covert action as a minor activity, to many a controversial diversion 
from information gathering. Yet in its wide spectrum, from support 
for guerrilla warfare at one extreme to unattributable information 
services at the other, it remained a significant American investment, 
even though belief in it waxed and waned. Britain was more cau-
tious but made its contributions. Covert action appeared to be a 
means of keeping the adversary under pressure, and of waging the 
Cold War with containable risk. 
So covert action was important to both sides. Early Western 
support for resistance movements in Eastern Europe has now been 
well documented. But despite the corpus of publications about it, 
covert action in the Cold War as a whole needs more attention 
than it has been given, and putting into its overall context. Opera-
tions whose effects might justify attention of this kind include 
American funding of Italian anti-communist parties after 1945; 
the USSR's support for the collapse of Western colonialism and 
its covert influence in the post-imperial regimes, particularly 
India; its assistance to militant trade unionism in the decades of 
10 The KGB's official definition of intelligence-gathering was as "'3 specific form of 
political struggle used by the intelligence agencies of;1 state ro help it to fulfill its 
internal ::md external functions", Scc Vasiliy Mitrokhin, [{GB Lexicolt: The SOl'iet 
IntelligeltCl! Officers Handbook (London: Cass, 2002), p. 200. 
11 Though the American Office of Strategic Services combined the two. 
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British economic failure; America's backing for rhe Mujahidin in 
Afghanistan, and provision of printing presses and other covert 
support to Solidarity in Poland. Indeed, covert action of all kinds 
may come to be seen as a significant contributor ro the collapse of 
empire on both sides: first those of the European colonial powers, 
and then the Soviet Union's. But we lack a synoptic view of this 
kind, and I shall not attempt one here. 
More has been written about espionage. The Soviet effort 
against the West became public knowledge thanks to Gouzenko's 
revelations after his defection from the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa 
in 1945, and other spy cases of one kind or another continued 
from this early period ro the end of the Cold War. The USSR had 
a roughly comparable incidence of high-profile Western cases. Es-
pionage was additionally linked to the use of diplomatic cover 
for recruitment and agent-running and the resulting diplomatic ex-
pulsions and tit-for-tat responses. Embassies were also targets for 
bugging and other technical attacks, and were themselves bases 
for comparable technical collection. 
In both East and \Vest these threats merged to arouse visceral 
fears of treachery, the special betrayal of trust, the enemy within, 
and encourage a paranoid political style. The conspiratorial Soviet 
regime had a special fear of conspiracies against it. Fact and fiction 
in the West combined to make spying seem much of what the Cold 
War was about, second only to The Bomb. Perhaps this is how it 
is still remembered today. 
Actiuities and Effects 
Some events connected with these various actiVities are already 
parts of Cold War history. Gouzenko's revelations played a signifi-
cant part in the West's disillusion with its wartime ally, and the 
Hiss and Fuchs cases in early 1950 may have contributed to the 
hard line of the American NSC-68 issued that summer. The shoot-
ing down of the U-2 over Sverdlovsk on 1 May 1960 led to the sub-
sequent break-up of the Paris Conference. The expulsion in 1971 
of 105 Soviet intelligence officers from their diplomatic cover in 
London froze UK-Soviet relations for some time. The fate of the 
South Korean airliner in September 1983 exacerbated a situation 
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of already high US-Soviet tension. Raymond Garthoff has com-
mented on this that 
each side thus converted its ready suspicions and worst assump-
tions about the other into accusations that could not be proved 
or disproved, but that tended to be believed by its own side and 
bitterly resented by the other. The upshot was to set American-
Soviet and Soviet-American relations considerably further back 
and undercut tentative steps towards an improvement in rela-
tions. 12 
These incidents occurred against a background of the many similar 
activities that did not become news but nevertheless added cumula-
tively to the effects. Some Western mobile operations were part of 
the Cold War choreography of "showing resolve", while others, 
particularly the early overflights of the USSR, must have stoked 
Soviet threat perceptions more directly. Using diplomatic cover for 
intelligence produced what I have called embassies' resemblance to 
medieval castles - "under a kind of intelligence siege, but with their 
intelligence sallyports from which their inhabitants struck at the 
attackers"u - and must have influenced diplomatic assessments. 
Oleg Gordievsky's autobiography recounts the claustrophobic 
precautions taken in the Soviet Embassy in London,I4 and an 
American diplomat has written with honesty of the effects of being 
under intelligence siege in Moscow on his own judgments: "it was 
hard not to let that situation impact on your own view of the 
former USSR".'-' The British review of the Soviet Threat in 1972 
gave some prominence to the presence in Europe (excluding the 
UK) of "more than 800 identified or suspected Soviet intelligence 
officers with official cover", and forecast that "the Soviet Union 
will increase the number of agents of influence and sympathisers 
... in order to influence \Vestern policies and undermine Western 
resistance to Soviet aims." 1<, All in all the threat of espionage linked 
12 Raymond L.Gurthon~ Detente and COl1jrol1latiolJ: US-Soviet Relat/rmsjivlIl NixolI to 
Reagall (Washington: Brookings, 1985), p. 1016. 
J 3 Hcrman, Intelllgel1ce Power in Peace and War, p. 186. 
14 O. Gordievsky, Next Stop Executio1l (London! Macmillan, 1995), pp. 257-8. 
-15 D.R. Hcrspring, "The Cold War: Perceptions from the American Embassy, 
Moscow", Diplomacy and Statecraft, vo!. 9, no. 2 (.July 1998): 200. 
16 G. Bcnnctt and K.A. Hamilton (cds.), Documents on British Foreign Policy 
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to covert action must surely have been intelligence's most pervasive 
influence on the Cold War psychology of both sides. 
Nevertheless the human and technical activities discussed here 
were not a major influence. Knowledge of them reinforced each 
side's adversary images, but did not create them. They were still 
small print compared with the main Cold War threats. Covert 
action excepted, intelligence's main influence was not in what it 
did, but in the knowledge it provided and the ability to provide 
it. 
Intelligence knowledge 
Tracking Soviet Activities 
Western governments bad voracious appetites for "facts" about 
the opponent and what he was doing, but there was always the 
problem that Soviet security limited the reliable facts available: 
most of intelligence's "facts" were sgueezed out of difficult raw 
material, and the important ones are best thought of as "analytic 
facts", of varying hardness and softness. Nevertheless there were 
great quantities of day-by-day and other routine reporting, mostly 
of factual Or quasi-factual kinds, on what was going on over the 
Soviet hill. 
Some of this material was used by governments to conduct the 
Cold War at the tactical diplomatic level of reacting to events and 
shaping them to best advantage. Some of it had a direct impact 
on Cold War history: the most notable was probably the 928 
photographs taken by the U-2 mission over Cuba on 14 October 
1962 that revealed the Soviet missiles there. The intelligence that 
tracked Soviet activities outside the Soviet Bloc - for example, 
noting the deployment of Soviet Air and Air Defence forces to 
Egypt in 1970 - was probably also of particular use in Cold War 
diplomacy. This was intelligence acting in its normal role as an 
extra source of government's information: helping foreign policy 
when intelligence is accurate, and making it less adept if it is wrong. 
But this did not shape the Cold War in any particular way. 
Overseas series III, vol. I: Britain and the SOlliet Union 1968-72 (London: 
Stationery Office, 1997), p. 528. 
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The same applies to intelligence's other normal role of suppor-
ting military power. Soviet armed forces were by far the main Wes-
tern target and were the subject of most of its output. Of this a 
substantial part provided timely accounts of their activities. Their 
importance was as a capability and a precaution, and will be discus-
sed later. By contrast another part of this output on Soviet forces 
was greatly used in the West's military preparation and training for 
war, and linked with it was intelligence's preparation for providing 
its own wartime support. Much the same may have been true on 
the Soviet side. Both sides had forty years in which to accumulate 
intelligence about the other, and I imagine that nothing has ever 
been studied and war-gamed as intensively as the putative battle 
on the North German Plain. A result, at least in the West, was that 
its forces were almost as well provided with intelligence on the op-
ponent as can be imagined in peacetime, and below the top level of 
government this was indeed intelligence's main Cold War utility. 
It may have added slightly thereby to Western confidence, but in 
other respects it was just an adjunct to military power: a weapon 
like the others, though less publicly visible and demonstrable than 
nlany. 
Linked to this was another normal intelligence function, 
though with special Cold War emphasis: support for the national 
information defences that sought to deny secrets to the opponent. 
Within this was the East-West war of attrition between the 
intelligence services themselves, in which each side sought to pene-
trate, disrupt, demoralize and deceive its opposite number. This 
was an inward-looking conflict but had some external effects. 
Intelligence knowledge in London and Washington about the ex-
tent of Soviet-controlled penetration of other Western countries 
was a factor in the UK-US exclusivity within the alliance. Within 
the UK and US themselves, the espionage threat was countered 
by intelligence's evermore complex compartmentation and sub-
comp~1ftmentation of its product: necessary security precautions, 
bur with the effect of reducing the intelligence product's value to 
its intended recipients. The same applied even more on the Soviet 
side, where its good access to Western secrets was often negated 
by the fears that what was obtained must be Western deception. 
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To these limited degrees, the two sides' intelligence services cancel-
led out each others' value by their threats of double-agents and 
penetration." 
Understanding: Soviet Intentions and Capabilities 
Apart from these undramatic effects through the provision of facts 
or quasi-facts, by 1945 British intelligence had also achieved the sta-
tus of expert at understanding its targets at the level needed for top 
policy decisions; and the fact-providing and understanding roles 
had merged. Being the expert on foreign forces had long been a 
role of military intelligence, but in Britain in the Second World War 
the new Joint Intelligence Committee (the JIC) had extended it to 
producing estimates and judgments about all aspects of the enemy: 
on Hitler's overall situation and how he would see it. It spoke au-
thoritatively to government with one voice: the Churchillian style 
was to insist that its product should be corporately agreed. Mini-
sters were there to take decisions and should not have to argue 
about intelligence interpretations. I' 
In 1945 this British machinery moved smoothly from war to 
peace, and two years later the American version of it appeared 
when President Truman created the CIA. Though the machinery 
differed, what had been practical reactions to the Cold War in 
both countries became permanent arrangements and received 
Anglophone doctrine. Intelligence exists to provide objective judg-
ments as well as facts; it deals with foreign targets, not its OWn 
side; it eschews policy recommendations; and government takes it 
seriously. (The Soviet side by contrast gave more weight to the pro-
vision of facts: intelligence provided them, and interpreting them 
was for the leadership). So in the West the practice of military 
intelligence was applied at the centre of government. Someone had 
to understand the USSR, and intelligence was the institution to do 
it. Yet what followed illustrates the complexity in practice. 
Understanding the USSR at the top, strategic level can be con-
sidered under the two conventional military headings of enemy "in-
tentions" and "capahilities". (Intelligence also worked On Soviet 
17 Herman, Intelligence Power il1 Peace and \Var, chapter 11. 
18 A dictum that Churchill did not apply to himself. 
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economic prospects and other aspects of the whole regime, bnt 
with limited impact: the USSR was studied as a threat rather than 
a society). Capabilities were Soviet power; intentions were the in-
tended use of it; power multiplied by intentions was the threat. 
But intentions were always the more important and difficult part 
of the equation. As the central problem was put by the lIC at 
the beginning of its report on "Russian Interests, Intentions and 
Capabilities" in 1948, "What is Russia trying to do?"" Almost 
everything followed from the answer. Assessing the intentions 
- or proclivities - of any government involves a great element of 
interpretation and conjecture, and this was specially so for the 
secretive and alien USSR. There were no hard facts and the judg-
ments were doubly inferential. 
Soviet military capabilities, including production, logistics and 
similar factors, were in principle more knowable. But there was 
still a dearth of hard facts and the uncertainty of the analytic ones. 
Moreover, the important Western interest was often in the future 
rather than the present: what would the next Soviet weapons be, 
and when would they appear? Since there was rarely any firm evi-
dence, answers drew on guesses about the adversary's intentions, 
often indeed on what his reaction might be to American plans. 
Would the USSR react to President Kennedy's nuclear programme 
of the early 1960s by seeking nuclear supremacy, parity or some-
thing less? Intentions in turn went back to capabilities: surely the 
size and composition of Soviet forces must be a good pointer to 
the regime's objectives? Deductions on the two were mutually rein-
forcing. Intelligence had the status of Keeper of the Threat, but 
this remained a mental construct with a lot of conjecture to it. 
Cold War Beginnings 
This was particularly so in the early years of the Cold War, roughly 
up to the Korean War. For intelligence this was the period of greatest 
difficulty. Its attack on the Soviet target had started almost from 
scratch on what were large and apparently intractable professional 
problems. It was a hard slog to produce even soft, analytic facts. 
19 JIC(48)9(O) Final, 23 July 1948 (London: India Office Library and Records, 
UWS/1I1173), first paragraph of Annex I, the summary. 
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In reality intelligence did not do badly, but there was only limited 
confidence in what it produced. 
Its relationships with policy were also not as well developed 
then as they became later. In America the separate armed services 
produced their own estimates, and their Joint Intelligence Commit-
tee (formed in 1941) produced its joint versions, but these had 
only limited influence outside the military.20 For some time after 
its creation in 1947 the CIA was still trying ro find its role, and the 
main series of National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) was not deve-
loped until the early 1950s. Sigint remained disorganized until the 
National Security Agency was set up in 1952. Apart from these 
organizational problems, the American community also lacked 
the sophistication it later developed. It provided facts when it had 
them, bur the important advice On Soviet intentions came from 
diplomats and knowledgeable individuals, not from intelligence's 
own ranks. Its transition to its subsequent status came with the 
Korean War and the Eisenhower Presidency, bur it was not a 
strong Washington player until then. 
This early limitation did not apply to the same extent in 
London, where the lIC had been up and running from the outset 
of the Cold War. Nevertheless, the JIC was still a Chiefs of Staff 
committee, nominally part of defence. The Joint Intelligence Staff 
which prepared its reports had lost the talented and independently 
minded civilians in uniform who had contributed so much to its 
wartime effectiveness. The 1948 report just quoted, "What is 
Russia trying to do?", now appears to be a rather crude "cut and 
paste" compilation from separate, departmental contributions, in 
the style of "joint service writing" that was then the military fash-
ion. 21 Service intelligence had reverted to its limited prewar status, 
20 For details of tbe American JIC sce Larry A.Valero, "The American Joint 
Intelligence Committee and Estimates of the Soviet Union, 1943-1947", Studies 
il1 Jnteflr'gcl1ce, no. 9 (Washington: Ccnter for the Study of Intelligence) (summer 
2000). It remained in existence as- part of the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization until 
1958. 
21 The 1948 report at note 19 consists of a (brilliant) two-and-a-half page summary, 
and main sections with A4 page lengths as follows: "Fundamencal Principles 
in the Outlook of Soviet Leaders" (1 Y.z), Capabilities (Economic and Militarvl 
(IS), General Soviet Policy (9), Soviet Interests and Intentions by Area (36). By 
comparison it~ 1972 equivalent (note 15 above) is now primed on 17 (smaller) 
pages, and had a single author. 
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and the new, postwar civilian Joint Intelligence Bureau had ani\' 
been given a restricted role. No part of postwar intelligence wa·s 
set up to be the expert on Soviet policy: a vestige perhaps of the 
prewar assumption that foreigners' policies were the business of 
the Foreign Office. Diplomats there and in the Moscow Embassy 
carried more weight, rather as in Washington. The Foreign Office 
chaired the JIC, but for a time put its energy into its own, in-
house, "Russia Committee". The JIG's reports were felt to be im-
portant, but on the enigma of Soviet intentions they may have 
been articulating compromises that the Foreign Office and the mili-
tary had reached elsewhere on the big issue of rearmament. In the 
relationship between intelligence and policy the evidence is not 
clear on who was influencing whom. 
Whatever the historical obscurity, British and American intel-
ligence did not precipitate the Cold War. Hostility between East 
and West was inevitable in some form. The key Western views of 
Soviet motives were formed and solidified in these formative years 
through experience of Soviet behaviour, and in the UK and the 
US it was others in and around government who developed such 
views, rather than intelligence. The stroke of luck of Gouzenko's 
defection, and the intelligence that came from it on the extent of 
Soviet espionage, certainly contributed to the Western view of the 
opponent, but it was never the main factor behind setting the West 
on its Cold War course. 
Nevertheless, the .lIC in this early period did give its imprimatur 
to what was to become the UK's position throughout the Cold 
War. Soviet motives were judged to be a mixture of hostility to the 
capitalist West, the conviction that history was on communism's 
side, anxiety about the Western threat to Soviet security, and a 
preference for caution, though without excluding opportunism. 
A hot war was not inevitable, but the Cold War would be a long 
haul against a determined and calculating opponent. In general 
terms this also became CIA's central position. But in the US, and 
perhaps also in the UK, it was reached in the first instance by 
policy-makers in government, and the intelligence contributions 
were only supportive. 
More important was intelligence's initial contribution to the 
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"capabilities" part of the threat. Soviet power was essentially mili-
tarv: if the West fell it would be because of the Soviet armv or 
the'threat of it, rather than Soviet subversion - at least afte; the 
immediate post-1945 years and the Marshall Plan. Soviet armed 
forces were intelligence's main target, and its estimates of them 
were the source of the essential facts and forecasts that became the 
basis of tbe West's defence policies in this formative period. 
In this early period three intelligence conclusions were of par-
ticular importance. One was that the Soviet Union would be in no 
state to go to war until some time in the future, estimated eventually 
as the mid-1950s. Another was that the Soviet army's peacetime 
size at that time was atound 175 divisions. This was creditable an-
alysis, but it involved the assumption that these were all active divi-
sions. It was not until the late 1950s and early 1960s that it was 
appreciated that their actual status was of the order of one-third 
full-strength, one-third partial strength, and one-third cadre,22 but 
by then the Western image of overwhelming conventional Soviet 
superiority had taken firm hold. The third conclusion, with similar 
effect, was that the armed forces of the Soviet European satellites 
could be counted as Soviet assets, with relatively few reservations 
about their reliability, These reservations then diminished further 
in later years as the Warsaw Pact seemed to be consolidating. 
For the future, the most important forecasts at that time were 
those on Soviet missiles and nuclear weapons. Much has been made 
out of the Western surprise over the first Soviet nuclear test, two 
years earlier than expected, but the early forecasts of the Soviet 
ability to launch nuclear strikes on Europe in the second half of the 
1950s were not too wide of the mark; though the forecasts of the 
ICBM threat to North America in this same period were pitched 
some years too early. These and other forecasts were based even at 
22 Ivlatthew A. Evangciis[a, "Stalin's Postwar Army Reappraised"', Intematiollal 
SCClIrit)', vol. 7, no. 3 (winter 1982-3): 112, quoting an opinion of Paul Nitze. It 
has been argued that reasons for reducing the 175-Division threat were recognized 
in intelligen~e circles quite early in the 19505, but not incorporated in government 
pronouncements. 0.5. DufficJd, "Soviet Military Threat to \'<'estern Europc", 
Journal o{StrJtegic 5tudies, vol. 15, no. 2 (June 1992)). Thc distinction between 
cadre strength, low strength and combat-ready Divisions was not incorporated into 
US intelligence estimates until the early 19605. (R.L. Garthoff, "'Estimating Soviet 
Military Force Levels", Internatio1lal Security, \'01. 14, no. 4 (spring 1990). 
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this early stage on impressive work on Soviet production, but except 
for the immediate future they necessarily consisted of what the 
USSR could produce if military preparations were given sufficient 
priority. These became part of the West's image of what it lUould 
produce, and thence part of the spiral of military procurement on 
both sides in which "worst case" forecasts of the adversary be-
came self-fulfilling. Nevertheless their general impression that the 
development of Soviet nuclear and conventional weaponry could 
produce a period of danger from around the mid-fifties onwards 
was the basis of Western strategy, and turned out to be not too far 
from what happened. 
Improued Intelligence Status 
After its limitations up to the Korean War, intelligence's influence 
increased progressively. Institutionally the CIA developed its spe-
cial, non-departmental status, and swung into action in the 1950s 
as the NIE's acquired authority. Development in Britain was more 
gradual but nevertheless considerable. The lIC shed its defence-
oriented subordination to the Chiefs of Staff, becoming a Cabinet 
Office committee in 1957. After the formation of the unified De-
fence Intelligence Staff (OIS) in 1964 the influence of the three 
individual services weakened, but was not eliminated. After the 
creation of the llC's new Assessments Staff in 1968 its product 
ceased to be amalgams of departmental contributions and became 
more powerful and holistic. 
Even more significant was the increased success of British and 
American collection. This was largely a gradual process, in some 
ways like the British children's board game of snakes and lad-
ders:" successes tended to be compromised by Soviet espionage 
or American press leaks and then eliminated by Soviet security 
measures." Nevertheless, there were cumulative gains, and to these 
was added the major and lasting success of tbe American satellite-
borne photography from the early 19605 onwards. Thanks to this 
23 On the throw of a dice the competitor moves upwards and forwards if he lands on 
a square with a ladder, and downwards and backwards if he lands on onc with a 
snake. 
24 Macthew ~\'1. Aid and Cees Wicbes {cds.l. Secrets of Siglla/s/lltelligellce during the 
Cold W'aral/d Beyond (London: Frank Cass. 20(1), pp. 18-19,34-35. 
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imagery and its synergy with other sources the West came to be 
increasingly well informed about Soviet military hardware and its 
production and disposition. Anything visible was sooner or later 
observed, analyzed and counted, its movements noted and, up to 
a point, its characteristics determined. The transparency extended 
beyond military materiel to include formed units. The result was a 
more accurate and confident picture than before. When data was 
exchanged and verified in the East-West arms control agreements 
of the 1970s and 1980s, first on the US and Soviet strategic nucleat 
arsenals and then later on other forces, the Western estimates were 
found to be accurate in most respects. 
There was also more evidence from which to infer Soviet combat 
effectiveness, but the problems remained of assessing Soviet forces 
through Western eyes. Judgments of their quality remained figu-
ratively as two-dimensional as the photographs that were their ma-
jor ingredients. Estimates were strong on numbers, but more specu-
lative on quality and reliability. Intelligence was never sure whether 
the adversary was a paper tiger or ten feet tall, and protagonists of 
policy positions could always find analytic facts to support them. 
Nevertheless, the progress within collection and the sheer build-up 
of knowledge meant that by the 1980s Western governments pro-
bably had more information about opposing forces than any other 
modern state has ever had in peacetime. 
As intelligence acquired this greater competence and status it 
might have been expected to contribute more powerfully than be-
fore on both Soviet intentions and capabilities. On the fitst of these 
it was certainly expected to assess long-term Soviet motives, and as 
nuclear deterrence grew in importance these extended to judging 
hypothetical Soviet responses to proposed levels of Western threat: 
what US (or UK) capability for destruction was needed to deter 
the Kremlin effectively? 
Yet in this reading of the Soviet mind, intelligence's influence 
remained varied. Factually it made some major discoveries. One 
was the famous Khrushchev speech denouncing Stalin of 1956: 
it is now often forgotten that this was originally acquired by the 
CIA. Another was the British realization in early 1984, thanks 
to the evidence of its agent Gordievsky plus skilled analysis of 
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other material, that there had been heightened Soviet fears of a 
preemptive American strike in the early 1980s, culminating in an 
alert of some kind during NATO's Able Archer exercise of nuclear 
release procedures in November 1983. The Khrushchev discovery 
needs no comment. The British Able Archer assessment was to 
influence President Reagan's shift in 1984 from his "evil empire" 
portrayal of the opponent to a more moderate stance, foresha-
dowing the Western attitude to Gorbachev when he came to the 
fore.25 
But such facts, or analytic facts, on Soviet intentions remained 
limited; and the effect of intelligence's wider judgments is debatable 
in both countries, though the reasons are not the same. In Britain, 
the lIC was much respected and there was no dispute with what it 
said. Nuclear disarmament was a divisive issue among the political 
Left, but there was less controversy over Russian intentions; by 
Washington standards London had few out-and-out hawks and 
doves. The military fought its corners over defence budgets and 
leaned hard on the DIS for support, but the lIC was not much in-
volved except in nuclear policy. The Treasury, probably distrusting 
intelligence as an ally, did not seek to enlist its support. Despite 
the variations between moods of detente and greater tension, the 
early Cold War view on Soviet intentions remained substantially 
unchanged in the lIC's periodical reviews of it. 
What is unclear aboutthese is how far the committee was conside-
ring the evidence from scratch, without intellectual baggage, or 
whether it was legitimizing the long-standing Whitehall consensus 
- not exactly going through the motions, but starting without seri-
ous doubts about the conclusions. It must be remembered that 
the lIC comprised not only intelligence proper but also its non-
intelligence members, notably the Foreign Office which chaired it 
25 The literature includes Peter Vincent Pry, W'ar Scare: Russia and America1l 011 
the Nuclear Brink (London and Wesrport: Praeger, 1999), chapter 6; Raymond 
L Garthoff, "Foreign Intelligence and the Historiography of the Cold War", 
lotlmal of Cold W'ar Studies, val. 6, no. 2 (spring 2004): 40; Frirz W. Ermarth, 
""Observations on the 'War Scare' of 1983: From an Intelligence Perch", Parallel 
His/ory Project 011 NATO and the \VarSl1W Pact (PHP) (Swiss Federal Institute of 
Technology Zurich [online 8 Aug 2006]), by permission of the Center for Security 
Studies at ETH Zurich and the National Security Archive at the Georgc Washington 
University on behalf of the PHP nctwork._ 
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and supplied most of the horsepower in the drafting staff. In the 
last years of the Cold War, its Chairman, a retired senior diplomat, 
also doubled as the Prime Minister's foreign policy adviser, an ar-
rangement that made the intelligence-policy relationship particu-
larly close. 
It would be perverse to argue against this backdrop that the JIC's 
reports were not proper "intelligence", but its unusual cOlnposi-
tion as an intelligence body should be remembered. Lawrence 
Freedman has commented on military estimates that 
the point is not that military intelligence officers are prone to fol-
low slavishly the demands of their political masters, but that they 
have been socialised into a particular world-view which is shared 
by the main consumer of their work.26 
Could this also be applied to the lIC system and its membership? 
Did its view of the Soviet Union reflect a tacit intellectual stitch-up 
between diplomats and the military over the nuclear deterrent and 
the size of the defence budget? Was intelligence speaking to policy, 
or policy speaking to intelligence and just being echoed? The fact 
that its reports were well received cuts both ways. 
In spite of the superficial similarities, the Washington situation 
was very different. The intelligence community there was unambig-
uously "intelligence" and not a British-style hybrid. The CIA be-
came unrivalled as a centre of Soviet expertise, and was indeed cri-
ticized for being too academic and distant from government. But 
American "intelligence" was no monolith. Unlike the consensus-
driven British example, the system encouraged diversity at every 
stage. The CIA was the first among equals, but other members of 
the community could "take a footnote" of dissent in the NIEs. They 
would also produce their own analyses and conclusions for their 
own departmental customers. This was of particular importance 
in Defence; and there the four service intelligence organizations 
could also produce their own interpretations, usually coinciding 
with the varied and intense single-service interests. 
The result could be the converse of the Britain's intelligence 
26 Lawrence Freedman, US Intelligencc and the "Jouie! Strategic Threat (London: 
MacmiHan, second cd. 1986), p. ] 86. 
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consensus. Cold War issues had far greater political salience in 
Washington than anywhere else; everyone was either for or against 
the current policy; the individual armed services (particularly the 
navy) often had their own Cold War strategies; and the latest intel-
ligence was usually ammunition in the public and private firefights 
that followed. Those at the top policy levels could usually find 
intelligence to suit them, and if not there were plenty of private 
think tanks to provide alternatives. CIA's record as the senior in-
telligence body is of a moderating influence, but its standing with 
government varied: broadly speaking, Democrats respected its 
judgments, while Republicans were inclined towards others'. Intel-
ligence was prized as never before, bur often to support policy 
preconceptions rather than determine them. 
Over Soviet capabilities it was more influential. The long-lasting 
strategic instability traceable back to the effects of the erroneous 
American estimates in the 1950s is well known. The American 
view of the so-called "missile gap", after the earlier "bomber gap", 
led to the deployment of American missiles in Europe, but was still 
exploited in Kennedy's Presidential campaign of 1960. The results 
were the enhanced missile programme after he took office, the 
larger-than-forecast Soviet reaction to it, America's alleged "win-
dow of vulnerability" in the second half of the 1970s and early 
1980s, and the increased Reagan programme that followed. 
Yet this inaccuracy and the results are only part of the picture. 
Once satellite imagery had been properly developed there was 
no longer much doubt about the actual totals of Soviet missiles, 
ships, aircraft, tanks and other weapons. These numbers and the 
balance with the West loomed large in presentation and advocacy 
with publics, allies, enemies and the rest of the world, and counted 
heavily in what democratic governments decided. Their frequent 
basis in satellite photography gave them a particular credibility, 
even though photo-interpretation was as esoteric a craft as any 
other. There was less scope for exaggeration and politicization 
than in the years of the bomber and missile gaps. A surprising re-
sult of the improved British and American intelligence was that, 
despite the quite unprecedented secrecy on the Soviet side in which 
it began, the East-West arms race was eventually conducted rela-
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tively openly, by contending parties quite well informed about each 
other, rather like the earlier arms races before 1914 and 1939. 
The numbers, and confidence in them, also had an effect on 
diplomatic tactics. The September 1961 CIA report, showing 
that ICBM inferiority was all on the Soviet side, was used shortly 
afterwards to reverse the tenor of previous Kennedy-Khrushchev 
relations.27 There were also many other, more complex effects at 
the expert levels of defence planning. One was in nuclear planning 
when American planners drew on the new lexicon of mutual nu-
clear deterrence, launch on warning, first strike survivability, reta-
liatory threat, nuclear sufficiency and the like. For their practical 
application these needed good data on the Soviet side, not only 
on missile totals, but also on MIRV-ing, accuracy, throw weight, 
warheads' nuclear yield, and destructive effects. American intel-
ligence became able to provide these Soviet numbers, not only 
from sateJlite imagery of missile silos and submarine launch tubes, 
but also from the UK and US success in intercepting telemetry 
from Soviet test firings and exploiting the results. Weapons that 
the West had never seen could be reconstructed and modelled into 
a kind of virtual reality. 
This became particularly important when ICBM survivability 
emerged as a central issue. Lawrence Freedman commented that for 
eight years after 1969 the problem of the American Minuteman's 
perceived vulnerability was "at the centre of strategic debate, ac-
cepted by all as the most serious potential source of instability in 
the strategic balance"." After intelligence discovered the Soviet 
ABM system, its present and future capabilities became equally 
important factors in American and British decisions. Intelligence-
based estimates were embedded within all the expert arguments, 
and gave them some earthing to reality. It was not unreasonably 
expected in the 1950s thatthe West would never have more than the 
haziest information about Soviet missiles and their performance, 
and it is arguable that had this remained true, the American drive 
not to be outstripped might have developed differently. 
27 John Lewis Gaddis, \l;re Now Know: Rethinking Cold Wlar History (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1997), pp. 256-7. 
2£ Freedman, US Intelllge1lce and the SOlliet Strategic Tbreat, p. 182. 
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The same may be true of planning for conventional weaponry, 
and examples can be quoted of the improved effects of intelligence 
in Britain. A battle tank programme was cancelled after disconcer-
ting intelligence appeared to show a weakness against its likely 
Soviet opponent. The ground defences of the nuclear V-Force bas-
es were reorganized after intelligence seemed to show a threat of 
attack by covert Soviet Spetsnaz forces. Air defences of the UK as 
a whole were strengthened after intelligence on new Soviet aircraft 
stiffened earlier threat assessments. 
Nevertheless, it is not easy to see such clear effects. Despite in-
telligence's improved quality, many of its analytic facts were still 
open to debate. In the 1980s CIA doubted whether the use of chemi-
cal weapons was still part of Soviet military planning for conventio-
nal war in Europe, while others (including the British) argued on the 
same evidence that it was. There was prolonged argument whether 
the new Soviet Backfire bomber could attack the American home-
land. Yardsticks for judging Soviet effectiveness were elusive. Apart 
from aerial combats in the Korean War, the forces of the East and 
West had never fought each other, and the Soviet army had never 
fought anyone before Afghanistan. In its design philosophies, the 
West sought to lead Soviet military technology and not imitate it: 
unlike its opposite numbers, Western intelligence was not charged 
with acquiring Soviet designs to copy them. Western defence pro-
grammes had the powerful momentum of past investments and 
institutional interests, including those of industry and politics, and 
it took a lot of intelligence to deflect them from their course. For 
Britain the transatlantic relationship gave its forces, particularly 
the Royal Navy, powerful incentives for remaining in step with 
their American counterparts. Intelligence was always part of the 
armed forces' bids for conventional resources, but was only one 
factor. It may have weighed less heavily there than in the nuclear 
planning that had fewer institutional inheritances. But until more 
case studies of Western defence planning have been put together, it 
will be difficult to judge intelligence's precise influence anywhere. 
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Intelligence and its own capabilities 
Arms Control 
Apart from its activities and the knowledge they produced, intel-
ligence also influenced the Cold War through its own capabilities: 
in its potential for knowledge production, rather than through the 
knowledge it was actually producing. One specific effect of this 
kind was in its support for arms control. Initially this was through 
what it had learned about Soviet missiles, so when America initi-
ated the negotiations on strategic nuclear limitation in the late 
1960s a baseline of data was available to start ftom. Without it, 
arms control would never have got underway: 
It was in large but unrecognised measure US confidence in the 
quality of the intelligence on Soviet forces during the late 1960s 
an early 19705 [hat allowed strategic arms limitation negotiations 
to begin at all." 
But intelligence's importance then became its ability to do this in 
the future and provide the verification on which the agreements 
depended. As long as on-site inspection was unacceptahle to the 
Soviet Union, this waS a key part of the American proposals, and 
the fact that the USSR was able to reciprocate with its own imagery 
satellites and telemetry interception (perhaps from intelligence ves-
sels stationed off the Florida missile range) enabled intelligence 
to be part of the bilateral agreements. A further key part of arms 
control history was American intelligence's success in persuading 
Congress that it could meet the verification requirements. 
Hence American intelligence abilities and their matching on the 
Soviet side largely determined the forms of arms control. SALT I 
was cast in terms of launchers (missile sites and missile tubes in 
submarines), not missile production, because launchers were what 
imagery satellites could see. The limitations on throw weights and 
MIRV'd warheads in SALT 11 were possible because Western tech-
nical intelligence yielded data on these parameters. Intelligence in 
this verification role, under the label "national technical means" 
19 W.H. Kincade, "Challenges to Verification: Old and New", in I. Bellany and C.D. 
Blackmorc (eds.), The Verification of Arms Control Sagrccmcllts (London: Cass, 
1983), p. 26 
34 FORSVARSSTUDIER 112006 
(NTMs) of information-gathering, received treaty recognltJon in 
the provisions of the ABM Treaty and in SALT I and SALT Il 
that it might be used by each party for this purpose, without inter-
ference or impedance by the other party through deliberate con-
cealment measures. 
This was the first legitimization of intelligence collection, and 
the first undertaking not to take defensive measures against it. 
SALT Il negotiations also provided specifically against any furtber 
Soviet encryption of telemetry channels. What emerged was, in 
John Gaddis' words, a "reconnaissance satellite regime" between 
the Cold War superpowers. lO It was carried further in the INF 
and START treaties, along with agreements for specific displays of 
equipment to imagery satellites.31 START also banned telemetry 
encipherment completely.l2 NTMs subsequently acquired Some 
multilateral legitimacy in the CFE agreement," and in CSCE's 
Stockholm Document of 1986.34 Whatever part arms control play-
ed in Cold War history, American intelligence's capabilities, plus 
the Soviet position in the same league, were the means of getting 
it underway and maintaining its impetus until on-site inspection 
became possible as the Culd War wound down. 
30 10hn Lcwis Gaddis, The Long Peace (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 
pp. 195-1.14. 
31 Thus article XII of the INF Treaty provided for each side to be able to request six 
open displays per year of road-mobile ground-launched missiles at operating bases; 
not later than six hours after receiving a request, roofs of alllaullchcr structures 
were to be slid open, and missiles and launchers moved into the open fOf a period 
of twelve hours. (J.K. Lcggctt and P.~l. Lcwis, '"Verifying a START Agreement: 
Impact of INF Precedents", SlIrl'l!'al, vol. 30, no. 5 (Sept/Oct 1988): 413). Tbe 
START I agreement included similar provisions for monitoring mobile ICBMsj see 
A.S. Krass, "Update: Verification and START: a Progress Report" in J.B. Panic and 
R. Gurhrie (edsl, Verification Report 1992 (London: Vertic, 1992), p. 57. 
32 The treat)' required the broadcasting of all telemetric information and banned 
any practice - including encryption, encapsulation and jamming - tbat denied 
access to it by NT1\h. It also required the provision of full telemetry tapes and 
certain information that helped in their interpretation. This was "a new and highly 
significant commitment to transparency in military affairs." (Dctails and quotation 
from Krass, "Update: Verification and START ... ", p. 59.) 
33 Signatories agreed not to interfere with national or multinational technical 
verification or impede it by concealment; and to consider cooperative measures to 
enhance national or multinational verification (Trust and Veri!:\:" no. 4 (October 
1989)). 
34 V. Kunzendorf, "Verification of Conventional Arms Control", Adelphi PalJers, no. 
145 (London: nSS/Brassey's, 1989): 52. 
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"Warnillg 
If support for arms control was the area where intelligence's poten-
tial had its most specific Cold War influence, another Was less 
specific but more important. This was intelligence's warning role, 
the antidote to the fear of surprise Soviet attack, the trip-wire to 
alert all other trip-wires. Pearl Harbor had seared itself into the 
American consciousness, and fear of a surprise Soviet attack was 
a lasting American concern. The British experience of warning fail-
ures had been less traumatic, yet the German invasions of Norway 
and France in 1940 had pointed to the need for warning, and 
Churchill charged the jlC with producing appreciations for him 
"at any hour of the day or night". After 1945 the American con-
cern about warning was spurred by the attack on Korea and the 
subsequent Chinese intervention, and warning machinery was set 
Up.]5 Britain then responded to a later American initiative to ex-
tend this to a tripartite system to include Canada. 
In providing for this it was always assumed that there would 
never be explicit evidence of a Soviet intent to attack or the decision 
to proceed. These would instead be inferred from departures from 
normality over wide ranges of Soviet activity, and the warning 
indicators that these would present .. This entailed monitoring 
Soviet armed forces and their supporting services as extensively 
and speedily as possible. 
From this requirement came the major US-led Western 
investment, on a multi-national basis that extended beyond the 
special UK-US-Canada relationship, to use technology to provide 
increasingly timely coverage of this kind with correspondingly 
accelerated computer processing and analytic support. The effect 
was to move towards providing twenty-four hour electronic sur-
veillance of the Soviet threat, though this was never complete or 
instantaneous. If an exciting part of the intelligence Great Game 
was the close-range collection around the Soviet periphery, a 
more routine but equally substantial one was the operatiun of the 
\Vestern network of reporting centres, situation rooms and duty of-
35 C.M. Grabo, "The Watch Committee and the National Indications Center: The 
Evolution of V.S. Strategic Warning 1950-75", International journal of Intelligence 
aud COllnterintellige1lce, VD!. 3, no. 3 (faU 1989). 
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ficers that incessantly followed and reported Soviet military moves. 
It is interesting that the Soviet Union adopted its Own warning sys-
tem in the early 1980s when the preemptive American strike was 
so much feared. 
In the West this accent on current intelligence was never solely 
for strategic warning. Some of the mobile collection operations 
needed their own real-time alerting systems for Soviet reactions 
that threatened their safety; and it was inconceivable in any case 
that Western governments should not have some current awareness 
of Soviet military activities, particularly of forces deployed Outside 
the Soviet Bloc. Nevertheless, strategic warning was a special re-
quirement of top priority, and provision for it at a near-wartime 
tempo became a distinctive feature of the Western intelligence ef-
fort. Of all the megatons of paper that Cold War intelligence con-
sumed, a considerable proportion must have been for the epheme-
ral material produced as part of this surveillance system. 
No one will ever know how effective it would have been 
against a real attack. Its record on Soviet moves against others 
was actually unimpressive. Intelligence failed to provide warnings 
of the military moves to crush Hungarian and Czechoslovakian 
independence in 1956 and 1968. It provided some indications of 
Moscow's preparation to take action against China in 1969, but 
it did not forecast the scale or significance of the Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistan in 1979, though it did do better in following the 
aborted preparations for a military move into Poland in December 
1979 and spring 1980. We do not know how the Soviet leadership 
rated the West's ability to get warning of such moves, and whether 
this was a factor in its own decisions: though the detection of 
the missiles in Cuba probably left a lasting mark, and America's 
diplomatic signalling based on intelligence on the Polish situation 
in 1980-81 may have helped to deter Moscow from the military 
solution it was contemplating. 
But this record is hardly relevant. Belief in a warning capability 
was central to the West's politico-strategic stance. Despite the sur-
vivability of some nuclear forces, strategic deterrence as a whole 
needed some warning of a Soviet bolt-from-the-blue. The ability 
to resist a conventional Warsaw Pact attack on continental Europe 
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depended on warning time for NATO's large-scale mobilization 
and reinforcement, There were endless debates about the warnings 
that could be expected for various scenarios of a Soviet attack, 
but the bottom line was that the West believed in its warning 
system, even if it had no other option. The Soviet Union was 
no doubt well aware of this, and probably believed in it as well. 
Less formally, it was recognized in the West that timely warning 
could help to prevent war by mutual misperception, or because 
of accidents in the automated detection of missile launches and in-
coming warheads. As technology increased the impressiveness of 
the warning system, statesmen felt that they had some additional 
protection against the fog of Cold War crises, and this confidence 
was a significant stabilizing element. Even at the times of greatest 
tension, American Presidents never believed that they were about 
to be Pearl Harbor-ed. 
Effects overall 
The key question for the West was Soviet strategic intent. Intelli-
gence contributed in varying ways but on this it never had hard facts 
or unique insights to offer. It did not create the West's adversarial 
image of the USSR when it was first formed, though its evidence of 
Soviet espionage played a part. It became more influential later, but 
by then the Soviet image was well established, and continued to be 
refreshed by overt Soviet behaviour. On the whole Western intel-
I igence legitimized this general view of the adversary, or furnished 
evidence that others drew on for this purpose. 
We still do not yet know whether in what it produced it really 
got inside the mind of the Soviet leadership, particularly in the 
balance there between ambitions and fears. One of its handicaps 
on this was that those drafting its assessments were rarely aware 
of the scale of Western covert action and provocative collection 
against the USSR, and the effects these could have had on Soviet 
thinking. But we may never know whether the Western view of the 
adversary's intentions was "right" or ~(wrong". It was an integral 
part of the Cold War and may have been as self-fulfilling as other 
parts of it. 
Intelligence was of more effect on the Soviet military capabilities 
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that turned intentions into threats. It was the only authority on 
the Soviet military power to which Western defence policies were 
reactions. Its early inputs were important in establishing the \"(Iestern 
view of the Soviet preponderance of conventional land forces and 
the expectation of operational Soviet nuclear weapons and mis-
siles from the mid-1950s onwards. Subsequently the erroneous 
American estimates of the "bomber gap" and "missile gap" and 
their place in American politics produced what turned out to be 
the long-lasting instability in the two sides' strategic nuclear force 
development. But as the West's intelligence improved, its defence 
decisions came to be better geared to actual Soviet capabilities, 
particularly perhaps in nuclear weaponry. The "numbers games" 
in defence decisions were more firmly based in the second half of 
the Cold War than in the first. 
There were still distortions and uncertainties. Intelligence in-
clined towards worst cases, or was used by governments as evi-
dence to support them. Soviet effectiveness remained hard to judge, 
and future Soviet weaponry remained a matter of guesswork. In-
telligence was not treated with the objectivity it commands in seri-
ous war. It figured somewhere in all Western defence decisions, 
but its importance remains elusive. Nevertheless as it improved it 
increasingly limited the room for exaggeration and fantasies. Wes-
tern defence policies by the later years of the Cold War came to 
be better grounded in evidence, and less faith-based. There was no 
repetition of the situation at the end of the 1950s when intelligence 
could only offer genuine professional uncertainty whether rhe US 
was threatened by hundreds of Soviet ICBMs or hardly any. 
Other parts of Cold War history were more directly intelligence-
driven or intelligence-influenced. Covert action was obviously 
one. Arms control was another: it would never have been put into 
place without American satellites, and the American imagination 
in using them for this purpose. Intelligence stands out in some 
Cold War incidents and episodes: it drove much of the Cuba crisis, 
which might have run a different course if the Soviet missiles had 
been discovered later, or earlier. 
But considering the effort expended on it, Western intelligence's 
impacts at the detailed cause-and-effect level of Cold War history 
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seem fewer than might be expected. Intelligence comes into its 
own in war, and its clearest Cold War use was in preparing armed 
forces for the war they did not have to fight. Its significance in 
peace is always more diffuse and harder to trace. To return to the 
dichotomy at the beginning of this paper between swaying govern-
ments' decisions and influencing the atmospherics: the impact of 
intelligence (of botb sides) was probably as much on the second 
- the images, the moods, the fears, the leadership styles - as on 
the first. 
Part of this was the effect of intelligence activities in confirming 
(in the words of a British government poster in the Second World 
War) that "there's a war on". Soviet methods led the US to an 
early conviction that it had to fight the intelligence war in the same 
way as the opponent. As President Eisenhower noted in 1955, well 
after this had happened, "I have come to the conclusion that some 
of our traditional ideas of international sportsmanship are scarcely 
applicable in the morass in which the world now flounders" .3" The 
British never needed persuading about this. 
So both sides played intelligence hard ball. As the Cold War con-
tinued there was the succession of intelligence-related incidents 
plus the drip effects of East-West maritime and airborne encoun-
ters, the deeply clandestine technical operations (notably the early 
overflights of the Soviet Union), widespread espionage and covert 
action and their connections with diplomatic cover and diplomatic 
premises. Suspicion of them was as important as detection. The 
effect was to underline hostility and to weigh in the scales against 
detente. The Western intelligence bases around the Soviet periphery 
were less provocative, but were still part of the Cold War's line-
up of forces. Intelligence in all its operations was an affirmation 
of the long-term contest and hostility between the two competing 
systems in a state of abnormal peace. If this really shifted Western 
democracy towards the "garrison state" that its critics discerned,37 
then intelligence was a principal factor in the change. 
36 Quoted by John Lcwis Gaddis, The Cold War (London: Allen Lane, 2006), p. 165. 
37 For discussion and reference sec Peter Gill, PoliCing Politics: Security 11ltelligcnce 
and the Liberal Democrat£c State (London: Frank Cuss, 1996), p. 28. Sce also E. 
Sbils, The Ton1le1lt of Secrecy: The Background a1ld Consequences of American 
Security Policies (London: Hcinemann, 1956). 
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I n the opposite direction there was the psychological effect On the 
West's leaders and publics of feeling that as the Cold War continued 
they were knowing the enemy better. In the first hall of it, \'(Iestern 
intelligence performed creditably but could not command great 
confidence. By the second hall governments were less worried that 
new Soviet weapons would appear out of the blue. There were still 
plenty of scare stories about frightening Soviet capabilities and 
Soviet deception, and intelligence was cherry-picked to support 
them. But it was able to provide some test of advocacy against 
evidence, and had some effect in dampening the oscillations of 
American policy. There was no repetition of the policy panic in 
1957 when the appearance of the Soviet Sputnik seemed to show 
that America was being outstripped. In so far as the Cold War 
resembled an arms race of an earlier era, it was managed more rea-
listically than if complete Soviet secrecy had prevailed. 
This helped Western governments as their concern increasingly 
became to seek East-West stability: to manage the Cold War, rath-
er than seeking to wage it or end it. Most important for this, how-
ever, was the belief in intelligence's ability to provide warning of 
a Soviet attack. Many parts of the West's defence depended on it, 
and it was indeed a bulwark for the belief in Cold War manage-
ment. Here intelligence's important contribution under US leader-
ship was its harnessing of technology to provide a wartime-style 
warning system for permanent operation in peacetime, in effect 
continuously taking the pulse of the Soviet system. Hardly any 
action was ever needed on the extensive flow of ephemeral intel-
ligence this produced: strictly speaking, most of it was useless, a 
precaution against the attack that never came. But it helped to re-
duce the risk of mutual misperception and false alarms. The belief 
in this capability now seems more important than how it might 
have performed if actually tested. 
Now it is over we forget the Cold War's tension and fears, 
and the extent to which they might have increased its huge risks. 
Intelligence's surveillance reduced governments' uncertainty, and 
gave British and American governments some confidence that si-
tuations would not spin out of control. To repeat: American Presi-
dents never helieved that they were about to be Pearl Harbor-ed. 
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Subsequent experience since the terrorist attacks on the American 
homeland has shown us just how drastically a fear of surprise at-
tack can change the perceptions of governments and publics and 
shift decision-takers on to unexpected tracks. 
So did Western intelligence make a difference? I am inclined 
to support the verdict of Sir Percy Cradock, long-time Chairman 
of the British lIC, that "despite the best intentions, government 
is usually a hand-to-mouth affair. The Committee made it less 
so".38 Intelligence did the same in the more difficult conditions 
of Washington. It was fortunate in this that both countries drew 
on the professional heritage of 1939-45. that gave them an intel-
ligence gold standard to which they could aspire. British children 
at that time asked their fathers and grandfathers "what did you 
do in the First World War (or the Second)"? If they now ask the 
retired intelligence practitioner what he or she did in the Cold 
War, the answer might be that "I helped to tame it and avoid 
Armageddon" . 
38 Perey Cradock, Know Your Enemy: HoUl the Joint Intelligence Committee Salt' the 
W'orld (London: John Murray, 20(1), p. 302. 
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How much did intelligence 
matter in the Cold War? 
By J. Kelllleth McDollald 
We are the eyes and ears of the nation and at times its hidden 
hand. 
-CIA Mission Statement 
It has been said about advertising that half the money spent is 
wasted - but no one knows which half. Much the same might be 
said about intelligence, on which the US spent at least half a tril-
lion dollars in the Cold War.' I cannot produce a Cold War profit 
and loss statement for CIA, but I can look into some of its most 
important efforts to see what United States taxpayers got for their 
money. 
My paper focuses on the Central Intelligence Agency both be-
cause CIA and the Soviet KGB were the principal intelligence 
adversaries in the Cold War, and because after 14 years as CIA's 
chief historian I can evaluate that service's experience in a way 
that I could not attempt for the KGB.' Moreover, what mattered 
Patrick Raddcn Keefc, Chatter: Dispatches (r011l tbe Secret \f/orld of Global 
Etwesdropping (New York: Random House, 200S}, p. vii. 
2 Although the CIA has reviewed this paper to ensure that it includes no classified 
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about intelligence to the United States probably also mattered to 
its allies, its adversaries, and those who were neither. 
While the CIA was not alone in the secret war against the intel-
ligence services of the Soviet Union and its allies, one historian has 
observed that it "was to the Western effort as the US Army was to 
the Allied landing on Normandy in 1944, first among equals and 
the principal source of men and money."~ 
Although the United States had got along with almost no intel-
ligence capabilities from 1776 to the eve of the Second World War, 
by 1945 the US had developed all forms of intelligence to a high 
state. In the two years after the war's end, the United States thor-
oughly reorganized its defense and foreign policy establishment in 
the National Security Act of 1947. Created by that statute, the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency arrived on the scene in September 1947 as 
US civilian and military policy makers reached a consensus that 
an aggressive and intractable Soviet Union was the major threat 
to the peace and stability of the postwar world. From that time 
forward, intelligence unquestionably mattered mightily in waging 
the Cold War. 
CIA's intelligence work falls into two categories: traditional in-
telligence and covert action.' This paper focuses on traditional 
intelligence, which involves the collection and analysis of informa-
tion. Intelligence collection includes classical espionage, the intel-
ligence CIA gets from human informants, liaison, and open sour-
ces. Collection also includes technical means such as imagery and 
signals interception from high altitude aircraft and satellites. Since 
the U-2's first flights in 1956 and the Corona spy satellite's first or-
bits in 1960, these new sensors and collectors have become crucial 
for US intelligence. Intelligence analysis involves processing and 
evaluating information collected from all these sources to produce 
timely finished intelligence for policymakers.5 
information, that revicw neithcr constitutes CIA authentication of information nor 
CIA endorsement of my views. 
3 Thomas Powers, Intelligence \\'lars: American Secret His/or)' from Hitler to AI-
Ql1eda (New York: New York Review of Books, 2002) p.182-33. 
4 CIA sums up the-sc two roles: "Wc are the eyes and cars of the nation and at times 
its hidden hand." Central InteJligence Agency, "CIA: Vision, lvl1ssion, and Values"', 
(Central Intelligence Agency [online 8 Aug 1006]). 
S Central Intelligence Agency, "CIA: Vision, Mission, and Values". 
44 FORSVARSSTUDIER 112006 
Since 1963 CIA had divided responsibility for collection be-
tween the Directorate of Science and Technology (DS&T), which 
manages satellite intelligence, and the Directorate of Operations 
(DO), which manages clandestine collection, largely from human 
sources." Intelligence analysis is the responsibility of CIA's Directo-
rate of Intelligence (DI), which also has a major role in preparing 
National Intelligence Estimates. 
Intelligence has been defined as "knowledge and analysis design-
ed to assist action."? It involves both the collection and analysis 
of information and procedures to put findings at the disposal of 
policymakers. The quality of intelligence depends on its precision 
and accuracy and on its timeliness and relevance to policymakers' 
concerns.' Since CIA's job as an independent agency is to provide 
objective intelligence in support of policymakers, it does not itself 
have a policymaking role.' 
Cold War policymakers needed intelligence to provide a forecast 
or estimate of future developments. At one end of the spectrum, 
intelligence monitors current events and trends, and alerts policy-
makers to emerging and long-term problems. At the other end, 
intelligence may nccd to respond quickly in a crisis or warn of an 
imminent attack. In the Cold War, CIA's primary mission, intel-
ligence collection and analysis, has always mattered most. 
CIA's other capacious mission, covert action, ordinarily has lit-
tle to do with collection and analysis. Before taking up CIA's tra-
ditional intelligence mission in the Cold War, I should briefly des-
cribe the on-again, off-again role of its covert action operations. 
By definition and in practice, such operations are not intended to 
6 The DO also manages covert action operations, as well as counterintelligence to 
protect CIA's organization, sources, and methods from outside penetration. 
7 Robcrt Bowlc, quoted in Ernest .May, cd., Knowing Oue's Enemies: Intelligence 
Assessment Before the Two W!orld Wars (Princecon, NJ: Princcton University Press, 
1984) p. 3. CIA's "'vision" statement declares "Wc will provide knm ... lcdge <lnd rake 
action to ensure the national security of the United States", Centrallntclligence 
Agency, "CIA: Vision, 1' ... 1ission, ancl Values". 
8 Iviay (cd.), Knowing One's Enemies ... , p. 3. 
9 The CIA reports to the National Security Council, but the Director of Central 
Intelligence was not a statutory member of that body. Neither CIA nor a National 
Intelligence Estimate can serve as a proponent or advocate of any particular policy 
option. 
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collect intelligence. 10 According to its current mission statement, 
CIA conducts covert action "at the direction of the President to 
preempt threats or achieve United States policy objectives." 11 You 
should understand that "covert action" is not a generic term for all 
of CIA's clandestine activities. Covert action involves secret opera-
tions or activities, designed first to influence foreign governments, 
organizations, persons or events, and secondly to be conducted in 
such a way that the US government's role is not apparent and can 
be plausibly denied if an operation is uncovered. 
As "the nation's secret hand," CIA's covert action operations 
have ranged from secret funding of student associations, trade un-
ions or political parties abroad, to efforts to support resistance 
groups behind the Iron Curtain or organize dissident colonels to 
overthrow a Third World regime. Unlike espionage (or "clandestine 
collection"), which ordinarily remains secret, covert operations 
are almost always exposed, usually sooner rather than later, and 
often with serious domestic and foreign political consequences. In 
the country involved, these secret interventions can leave a lasting 
legacy of hostility, fear, and suspicion of pervasive CIA conspira-
cies. 
In covert action's heyday from 1953 to 1961, when Alien Dulles 
was Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), CIA carried out large 
paramilitary operations in Iran, Guatemala, and Cuba. Later there 
were operations in Southeast Asia and Latin America in the 1960s 
and 1970s and in Afghanistan, Angola, and Central America in 
the 1980s. With the exception of CIA's covert aid to the Afghan re· 
sistance from 1979 to 1989, large paramilitary operations usually 
damaged US long-term interests even when they did not faiJ.11 It 
will require another paper, perhaps at another conference, to ex-
plain why CIA's covert action operations frequently frustrate and 
only rarely benefit American national policy or interests. 
10 The 1974 Hughcs"Ryan amendment to the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act defined 
covert action (for the first time in legislation) as "operations in foreign countries, 
other than activities intended solely for obtaining necessary inteJ1igc~cc." 
11 Centrnllntclligcncc Agency, "CIA: Vision, 1\,115slon. and Values". 
12 CIA's successful Afghan operation helped the MIl;ahidill drive the Soviet army out 
of their country, but the Taliban takeover, AI-Qaeda training camps, and bootleg 
Stinger missiles were part of its aftermath. 
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Leaving covert action aside, I shall concentrate on CIA's tradi-
tional intelligence mission, which is intended to provide timely, ac-
curate, and relevant information to help policymakers take action. 
I begin with the advent of overhead reconnaissance, the most im-
portant advance in the history of intelligence collection. I shall 
then turn to CIA's premier form of finished intelligence, National 
Intelligence Estimates, whose analytical base was revolutionized 
by overhead reconnaissance. 
Overhead Reconnaissance: the U-2 and 
Corona 
On the advice of a committee of scientists searching for means to 
prevent any surprise attack, President Dwight Eisenhower in late 
November 1954 directed CIA to build and operate a special pur-
pose, unarmed photo reconnaissance aircraft capable of flying safely 
at extremely high altitudes over the Soviet Union. l3 Recognizing 
that flying in another state's airspace without permission in peace-
time could be considered a hostile act, Eisenhower assigned CIA to 
lnanage the project and to fly the aircraft as a non-military, secret 
intelligence operation. Despite its total lack of experience with 
large or advanced technological projects, CIA produced this new 
aircraft, the U-2, in eight months, ahead of schedule and under 
budget." Lockheed's delivery of 22 of these aircraft to CIA in the 
first half of 1956 marked CIA's entry into a new world of overhead 
reconnaissance. 
From its first flight over the USSR 4 July 1956, the U-2 searched 
for Soviet production and deployment sites for intercontinental 
ballistic missiles (lCBMs), as well as for nuclear weapons produc-
tion and test facilities. In August 1957, U-2 flights first found the 
main Soviet ICBM launch site at Tyuratam, and then the Soviet nu-
clear testing grounds at Semipalatinsk. In the same month, August 
1957, the Soviets successfully tested an ICBM from Tyuratam, and 
two months later launched Sputnik I, the world's first artificial 
13 G.W. Pcdlow and D.E. Wclzenbach, The CIA and the U~2 Program, 1954-1974 
(Washington, DC: CIA History Staff, 1998), pp. 32-33. The U-2 was built to fly 
long missions without refucling at more tban 70,000 feet. 
14 4 August 1955 the U-1 made its maiden flight. 
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earth satelliteY 
The surprise of Sputnik encouraged some US journalists and 
politicians to project a missile buildup that would give the USSR 
an ICBM superiority over the US by the early 1960s. This so-called 
"missile gap" could make the US vulnerable to surprise attack. 
The U-2 flights over Russia ended on 1 May 1960, when a Soviet 
surface to air missile (SAM) shot down Gary Powers' aircraft. The 
next stage in overhead reconnaissance began less than four months 
later, when CIA at last launched into orbit an intelligence satellite 
codenamed Corona in August 1960. Imagery gathered by this new 
Corona satellite in 1960 and 1961 established conclusively that 
there was no massive Soviet buildup and hence no missile gap. 
In 12 years of operation, Corona took over 800,000 images 
that covered more than 600 million square miles of the earth's 
surface, including 1.65 million square miles of Soviet territory. It 
photographed missile and nuclear facilities, aircraft factories and 
airbases, and sites for constructing ships and missile submarines. 
It could uncover antiballistic missile sites, locate air defense missile 
batteries, and monitor ground forces' order of battle. From Corona 
the United States got its first timely, accurate and comprehensive 
coverage of the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and China. 16 
For the United States and CIA, the Corona satellite was the be-
ginning of a Cold War intelligence revolution. As the first of a 
succession of reconnaissance satellite systems, Corona changed 
CIA's structure and the way it produced intelligence for national 
policymakers. In 1963 CIA Director John McCone formed a new 
Directorate for Science and Technology (DS&T), which developed 
the succeeding satellite programs of ever-increasing capabilities, 
15 By orbiting Spumik I in 1957, the Soviet Union established an international 
precedent for the "freedom of space," which implied an unrestricted right of 
overflight in outer space. 
16 The first successful CORO:-lA flight in August 1960 acquired 3000 fect of film, 
which provided more photographic coverage of the USSR than all the U-l flights 
had produced up to then. R. A.lv1cDonald, cd., CORONA: Between Earth and 
SII1/: Tbe First NRO Reconllaissance Eye i1l Space (Bethcsda, !\'lD, ASPRS, 1997). 
See also Doc. No. I, K. E. Greer, "CORONA", and Doe. No. 14, CIA/PlC, Joint 
Mission Coverage Inuex, "Mission 9009, 18 August 1960", Sept. 1960 (Excerpt), 
in Kcvin C. Ruffncr, cd., CORONA: Americas First Satellite Program (\X!ashington, 
DC: CIA History Staff, 1995), Ce1lter (or tbe Study of imelligellce (Central 
Intelligence Agency [online 8 Aug 2006]). 
48 FORSVARSSTUDJER 112006 
complexity and expense. From the 1960s, CIA based its finished 
intelligence more and more on satellite imagery, which provided 
the US intelligence community with unprecedented knowledge 
abour the Soviet Union. 17 Former CIA director Robert Gates later 
observed that from that time the US was never surprised by a 
Soviet weapons system." 
Processing, evaluating, and most of all, exploiting the massive 
data from satellites posed new and difficult problems. Once CIA 
acquired this data, however, it became very good at gauging the 
character, size, and location of Soviet weapons, forces, and bases. 19 
At any given time CIA knew, for example, roughly how many 
combat aircraft or warheads the Soviets had, and where. Deter-
mining why the Soviets had that number and what they planned 
to do with them was, of course, a much more difficult enterprise. 
The ability accurately to locate, identify and count strategic forces 
nevertheless made it possible for Corona and the systems that 
succeeded it, along with the Soviet Union's counterpart satellite 
programs, to stabilize the last decades of the Cold War. It was 
a shared confidence in vetification by overhead reconnaissance 
that made SALT-I (the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty of May 
1972) and later agreements possible.'o Both the US and the USSR 
maintained their strategy of nuclear deterrence, but each side's 
ability to search and monitor developments in the other reduced 
the fear of surprise attack for both sides. This critical role of 
overhead reconnaissance in keeping the peace may be the most 
important answer to the question, "How much did intelligence 
matter in the Cold War?" 
In addition to its crucial importance for arms limitation veri-
-17 Some suspected a CIA ohscssion with technical intelligence. Secretary of State 
Alexander Haig once complained that, "'in the intelligence business, if you haven't 
overheard it on intercept, or seen it in a photograph, you're not interested in it". 
CIRA Newsletter (Spring, 2005): 3. 
18 Gates's statement did not mean that it wa!'; all pbin s;tiling after CORONA; 
identifying new weapons systems usually left open many questions concerning their 
possihle uses, projected numbers, etc. (e.g. the MIRV debate below). 
19 A good deal of credit must go to the National Photographic Interpretation Center 
(NPIC), which was formed in 1961 by combining CIA and militnry resources. 
20 Since neither the US nor the Soviet Union officially acknowledged unrillate in 
the Cold War that it was using spy satellites, arms control agreements referred to 
verification by "'National Technical Means." 
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fication, satellite intelligence also offered by far the most useful 
information for CIA's assessment of Soviet military capabilities 
right up to the end of the Cold War. Let us look at some examples 
of how CIA assessed Soviet strategic forces over the years for 
the intelligence community's ultimate product, the National 
Intelligence Estimate. 
CIA and National Intelligence Estimates: 
Soviet Strategic Forces 
CIA's major analytic organization, the Directorate of Intelligence, 
produced and disseminated mountains of finished intelligence to 
policymakers. These ranged from daily current intelligence (inclu-
ding the President's Daily Brief) to long-term estimates. I wish to 
look at the weightiest of these products prepared for senior policy-
makers, the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE). As the capstone 
of the intelligence pyramid, the NIE is a document usually drafted 
by CIA officers, coordinated with other members of the intelligence 
community, reviewed by senior panels, and submitted by the DCI 
to the President and National Security Council." 
Wben the National Security Act established CIA as an indepen-
dent agency in September 1947, current intelligence - especially 
daily summaries for the president - was its most important analy-
tical product. Efforts to produce long-term national estimates were 
few and indifferent. In June 1950, CIA, then a small new agency in 
the doldrums under an amiable bur ineffective director, was as sur-
prised as the rest of the United States' government by the sudden 
outbreak of the Korean War. To mobilize CIA for war, President 
Harry Truman appointed a new Director of Central Intelligence, 
Armv Lt. Gen. Waiter Bedell Smith. Taking office in October 1950, 
General Smith immediately reorganized CIA, following the 1949 
recommendations of a committee headed by Alien Dulles." Smith 
21 D. P. Stcury, cd. IntemiOlls ilnd Ca/labilities: Estimiltes 011 SOl'jet Strategic rorces, 
1950-/983 (Washington, D.e.: CIA History Staff, CSI, 1996) p. xiii. This volume 
contains 41 NIEs on Soviet strategic capabilities and intentions from the 19505 to 
1983, which i1Justr<ttc how CIA and the intelligence community performed their 
most crucial Cold \'('ar mission: to asseSS the Soviet threat to tht:' US. 
22 Truman nominated Gen. Smith on 11 August 1950, but because of serious surgery 
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was appalled at CIA's negligible production of estimates: when 
he arrived in October, CIA had not yet produced an estimate on 
Korea. 
To ensure a continuing series of long-term estimates Smith created 
a Board of National Estimates (BNE) of senior experts, chaired by 
William L. Langer, an eminent Harvard historian, and supported 
by a staff of CIA analysts in an Office of National Estimates 
(ONE). 23 The new Board of National Estimates produced its first 
National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) in November 1950 and by 
the close of 1953 had circulated almost 150. Although other in-
telligence organizations were involved in the NIE process, CIA's 
Board and Office of National Estimates, along with the large role 
of CIA analysts, gave CIA clear leadership over the process. Some 
of CIA's preeminence dissipated after 1973, when a new DCI, 
William Colby (whose CIA career had been in the Directorate of 
Operations), replaced the Board and Office of National Estimates 
with a system of National Intelligence Officers (NIOs), who were 
gathered into a new National Intelligence Council (NIC) in 1979. 
Every year CIA and the intelligence community produced 
a host of National Intelligence Estimates that covered not only 
the Soviet Union but the whole spectrum of issues of interest to 
US policymakers. Of all the estimates drafted, coordinated, and 
disseminated over the years, probably the most important Were 
those that responded to questions about the capabilities and 
intentions of Soviet strategic forces and the role of military power 
in Soviet doctrine, policy, and plans. To understand these develop-
ments in the tightly controlled Soviet society was a formidable chal-
lenge. Moreover, since these estimates influenced US military plans 
and procurement they impinged on a wide range of budgetary and 
he was not sworn in until 7 October 1950. Smith had been Eiscnbower's chief of 
staff 1941-1945 and Truman's ambassador to the Soviet Union 1946-1949. 
23 Langcr had headed the Research & Analysis Branch of the Offic[' of Strategic 
Services (OSS) in the Second World \XTar. Shcrman Kent, a Yale historian and OSS 
veteran, succeeded Langcr in 1952 and chaired the liNE until 1967. In its first 
year, the Board included three historians, an economist, a lawyer, and two senior 
CIA officers. Sherman Kent, "'The First Year of the Board of National Estimarcs: 
The Directorship of William L. Langer," in D. S. Steury, cd. Sberman Kent and tbe 
Board of National Estimates: Collected Essays (\,\Tashington, D.e.: CIA History 
Staff. CSI. 1994) p. 143-49. 
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bureaucratic interests. This often gave the NIE coordination pro-
cesS a hard edge and produced frequent footnotes dissenting from 
the coordinated consensus position. 
National Intelligence Estimates on Soviet strategic forces soon 
formed an annual series prepared by a permanent staff whose re-
search and analysis continued all year. "The resultant continuity 
and sheer intellectual concentration," writes Donald Sreury, "contri-
buted significantly to the sophistication, depth and intensity of the 
analysis that went into the Estimates. "24 A horseback survey of 
some of the debates these NIEs provoked over four decades will 
offer an idea of the importance of their analysis and its influence 
on American Cold War policy. 
By 1947 US policymakers, military intelligence, and CIA had 
reached a consensus that Soviet leaders based their policies and 
actions on an ideological conviction that a conflict between the US 
and the USSR was inevitable. By the mid-1950s, the military ser-
vices, then the leading contributors to national estimates of Soviet 
military programs, were gravely miscalculating the Soviet threat. 
They underestimated the growth of Soviet military manpower and 
expenditure and overestimated the growth of the Soviet submarine 
force and all-weather fighter interceptors. More significantly, seri-
ous overestimation of Soviet long-range bomber production led to 
a public outcry over a projected "bomber gap." While the US Air 
Force estimated 700 to 800 Soviet long-range bombers from 1955 
to 1957, the Soviets actually never deployed more than 150. By 
1958, CIA intelligence, especially from U-2 imagery, had made the 
illusory "bomber gap" disappear." 
A more politically volatile controversy soon followed over an al-
leged "missile gap", as mentioned in the previous section." From 
late 1957 (when the Soviet Sputnik stunned the US) to mid-1961, a 
24 Ibid., p. xix. 
25 Raymood L. Garthoff, "Estimating Soviet tvIilirary Intentions and Capabilities," ch. 
V in G. K. Haines and R. E. Lcggctt, \\!atcbil1g the Bear: Essays {m CIAs Analysis 
of the Swirl Ullion (Washington, D.e.: CIA, Center for the Study of Intelligence, 
2003). This section is mainly based on Dr. Garthoff's excellent essay and the 
estimates published in G. K. Haioes and R. E. Leggcn, CiAs Allalysis of the SOl'iet 
Unio1l1947-1991 (Washington, D.e.: CIA, Center for the Study of Intelligence, 
2(01). 
26 Sce p. 47 above. 
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series of National Intelligence Estimates projected a Soviet buildup 
of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) much larger and 
more rapid than the US program. Word of a developing "missile 
gap" leaked out and critics of the Eisenhower administration ex-
pressed alarm at the threat of surprise attack to the US and its stra-
tegic forces. Senator John F. Kennedy used the "missile gap" issue 
in his successful 1960 presidential election campaign against Vice 
President Richard M. Nixon. 
Taking the lead in alarmist forecasts, the Air Force sought in-
creased appropriations, while the other military services, State, 
and CIA were also uncertain and uneasy about the Soviet ICBM 
program. It was not until late 1961 that imagery from the new 
Corona satellite along with new analytical techniques revealed 
that Soviet leaders had decided to deploy only a few of the SS-6, 
their bulky first generation ICBM, and wait for a better second ge-
neration missile. The missile gap disappeared." 
After this estimative success, the Office of National Estimates 
confronted another question of Soviet missiles in the following 
year, when the Soviet Union secretly began to deploy nuclear-
armed medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles in Cuba. 
In September 1962, a few weeks before these offensive missiles 
were discovered, the Board of National Estimates circulated Spe-
cial National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) 85-3-62, which both 
failed to predict the Soviet action and insisted that such a step 
was unlikely. Fortunately, CIA Director John McCone, was not 
persuaded and insisted on U-2 flights over western Cuba. On 14 
October a U-2 flight photographed the nearly completed missile 
sites, in time for President Kennedy to take steps to force the 
Soviet Union's removal of the missiles. Although the erring SNIE 
had recognized a Soviet military advantage in placing missiles in 
Cuba, it insisted that the Soviet leadership was too prudent to 
take such an unprecedented step. It would be "incompatible with 
Soviet practice to date," the SNIE argued, and "would indicate a 
far greater willingness to increase the risk in US-Soviet relations 
than the USSR has displayed thus far." 2H Yet the estimate was 
27 Gnrthnff, '"Estimating Soviet l\-lilitary Intentions ... " 
18 M. S. lv1cAuiiffc, cd., CIA Documents 011 the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962 
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dead wrong in a warning failure that was probably the Board of 
National Estimates' worst lapse in the Cold War. CIA was able to 
recoup this error when the 14 October U-2 flight saved the day. 
In the 1960s and 1970s CIA's analysis of the Soviet ICBM 
threat diverged from that of military intelligence. In the 1950s 
CIA had agreed with the military consensus that in the long run 
the Soviet Union was seeking to achieve clear, Inilitary superiority, 
if possible. In the 1960 National Intelligence Estimates, CIA broke 
the consensus by contending that the Soviet ICBM buildup was 
intended to provide a substantial deterrent and preemptive attack 
capability, bur not a decisive superiority. The Air Force's emphatic 
and stubborn dissent, stated first in February 1960 and repeated 
in most NIEs on the topic for the next 30 years, insisted that the 
Soviet Union would not be content with a deterrent and preemptive 
capability, bur was working to attain, as soon as practicable, a 
military superiority over the United States which they would con-
sider so decisive as to enable them either to force their will on the 
United States through the threat of destruction, or to launch such 
devastating attacks against the United States that, at the cost of 
acceptable damage to themselves, the United States as a world 
power would cease to exist." 
This of course describes the Soviet goal as a nuclear first-strike 
capability, an attack so devastating that a US retaliatory strike 
could not cause unacceptable damage to the Soviet Union. In a 
serious contretemps at the beginning of the Nixon administration 
in 1969, CIA's Directorate of Intelligence and Board of Estimates 
vigorously opposed a Pentagon contention that the Soviets' 
latest ICBM, the SS-9, had a first-strike capability. Rejecting the 
Pentagon's claim that one volley of these missiles could destroy all 
70 US Minuremen missiles in their silos, CIA offered evidence that 
although the SS-9 missiles carried three warheads, they were nei-
(\,(!ashington, D.e.: CIA History Staff, 1992), Doe. No. 33, SNIE 85-3-61, "The 
j\dilitary Buildup in Cuba," 19 Sept. 1962 (Excerpt). In 1964 Sherman Kcnt, 
Chairman of the BNE, wrote a thoughtful retrospective explanation of why the 
Board erred so badly. "A Crucial Estimate Relivcd," in Stcury, ShernulIl Kent a1ld 
the Board of NdtiOlld/ Estillwtes ... p. 173ff. 
29 NIE 11-8-59, "Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Attack through l\.fid-1964" (9 
Feb. 1960), USAF dissent footnote, p. 3. (Quoted by Ganhoff, "Estimating Soviet 
l\:iilirary Intentions ..... ) 
54 FORSVARSSTUDIER 112006 
ther Multiple Independently Targeted Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs), 
nor (as the Pentagon later claimed) the "functional equivalent" of 
MIRVed missiles. lD 
In fact, the issue revolved around the Nixon administration's 
determination to build a US anti-hallistic missile (ABM) system, 
which an SS-9 first-strike threat would justify. A mid-1969 CIA 
memorandum updating the most recent Soviet strategic weapons 
National Intelligence Estimate repeated the long-standing position 
that the Soviet Union was not seeking first-strike ability. An out-
raged Secretary of Defense, Melvin Laird, accused the CIA of an 
attack on the Nixon administration's ABM policy. DCI Richard 
Helms reluctantly gave in to Laird's insistence and - to the intense 
chagrin of the Board of Estimates - withdrew the offending para-
graph.]1 This was one of few times that policymakers insisted that 
an estimate conform to their own policy. As it turned out, the 
Soviets never MIRVed the 55-9, and their first MIRVed Interconti-
nental Ballistic Missile only reached initial operational capability 
(IOC) in 1975,-" 
Throughout the 1970s, CIA and the National Intelligence Esti-
mates maintained that the Soviets were seeking at least strategic 
equality with the US and if attainable, some degree of strategic ad-
vantage. The US military, on the other hand, insisted that the con-
tinuing Soviet ICBM buildup aimed at achieving a first-strike ca-
pability, which would give the USSR world domination. Military 
intelligence, convinced that the Soviets unfairly exploited any 
Western concessions, typically opposed policies of detente, arms 
control, and increased trade with the USSR. 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, both the Carter and 
Reagan administrations warned that US defense spending was 
30 RU5scll Jack Smith, The Unkllou'lI CIA: A1}' Three Decades witb the Age1lcy 
(!\kLcan, V.: Brasscy-Pergamon, 1989) p. 205-7. CIA used advanced aerodynamic 
and ballistic trajectory evidence to refute the Pentagon claim that the SS-9's triple 
warheads' free fall would form a "footprint" that could destroy all of the US 
Minutemcn missiles before they could be launched. . 
31 Ibid., p. 207-8. Helms reasoned that he could make this concession since the update 
was merely an addendum co tbe original NIE, where CIA's long-standing position 
was still clearly stated. The Director of the Department of State's intelligence put 
the wirhdmwn paragraph back into the update memo, as a dissenting footnote. 
32 The US already had MIRVed ICB1vls by 1970. 
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in a dangerous decline while Soviet defense spending was al-
legedly increasing at about four to five percent a year. In 1982 
CIA analysts nevertheless found that the actual growth in Soviet 
defense expenditures since 1976 had averaged about two percent, 
while weapons procurement showed nO growth at all. The US 
"spending gap" silently disappeared.33 
In the final phase of the Cold War, from 1987 to 1991, the most 
important fault in National Intelligence Estimates on Soviet military 
power was their unwillingness even cautiously to acknowledge the 
radical changes in Soviet doctrine, policy, and strategy that were 
already underway 
NIEs in 1987 and 1988 continued to be skeptical of any 
fundamental change in Soviet military policy right up to the time 
that Gorbachev announced, in a December 1988 address to the 
UN General Assembly, that the Soviet Union would unilaterally 
cut its forces by 500,000 men and withdraw six tank divisions and 
5000 tanks from Eastern Europe. NIEs on Soviet policy, doctrine, 
and strategy were especially slow in reacting to the rapid changes 
under Gorbachev, finding it difficult to credit the new Soviet 
defensive strategy." Yet to the end, National Intelligence Estimates 
continued to state, without dissent, that the Soviet Union never 
had capabilities that could give its leaders confidence in surviving 
and winning a nuclear war. The debate was always over whether 
the Soviet leadership believed such superiority was attainable and 
whether they were driven to seek to achieve it." It was only when 
the Soviet Union finally disappeared at the end of 1991 that CIA 
no longer needed to defend its National Intelligence Estimates 
against the Pentagon's belief in a Soviet Union hell-bent on world 
domination. 
33 Ibid. Later Directorate of Intelligence research revealed that from 1974 co 1986, in 
spite of the perennial military dissents, CIA's NJEs had all overestimated the size of 
Soviet force moderni7~1rion plans. 
34 Garthoff, "Estimating Soviet Ivlilitary Intentions ... " 
35 Ibid. 
56 FORSVARSSTUDIER 112006 
Conclusions 
The answer to the question, "How much did intelligence matter in 
the Cold War?" is "A lot." It is hard to see, for example, how the 
Soviet Union and the United States could have reached their arms 
limitation agreements without satellite intelligence for reliable 
verification. The influence of any given NIE or NIE series on spe-
cific people and policy decisions is not easy to track, although the 
influence of the NIE series we surveyed, on the intentions and ca-
pability of Soviet strategic forces, is easier to discern than most. 
This is because, as the hard fights and dissents in coordination 
demonstrated, these estimates' concl usions could directly affect 
major US decisions on defense appropriations, weapons programs 
development, and force structure as well as foreign policy. 
Now, in the second decade since the Cold War's end, we can look 
back at the prodigious effort and money US intelligence invested 
in collecting everything useful to know about Soviet strategic 
arms capabilities and intentions. It was the analysis of this body 
of knowledge that enabled a succession of National Intelligence 
Estimates to guide the US to a happy ending in the long rivalry 
with the Soviet Union. Thus it was intelligence - above all Soviet 
and American satellite intelligence - that stabilized and eventually 
ended the Cold War arms race. "Great Powers can struggle vigor-
ously for decades without precipitating a global bloodbath," 
Thomas Powers has observed, "so long as both sides are good 
at discovering, but not too good at hiding, the secrets that really 
matter. "36 
36 Thomas Powers, Intelligence Wars: American Secret History (rom Hitler to 1'1/-
Qaeda (New York: New York Review of Books, 200l} p. 306. 
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On the Soviet side 
By Vojtech Mast11), 
Anyone attempting to compare the accomplishments of Western 
and Soviet bloc intelligence during the Cold War must start by 
recognizing two obvious differences: First, intelligence and its agen-
cies were integral to the totalitarian Soviet system in ways they 
were not to the pluralistic Western democracies. And second, what-
ever these services' accomplishnlcnts, they were not enough to save 
the system from its wretched end. Were there congenital flaws that 
hampered Soviet intelligence in serving the intended purposes of 
its masrers? If so, could its activities at least be credited with keep-
ing the Cold War cold? Looking at the historical record, these are 
the main questions addressed in this essay. 
The Stalin Era 
The secret services that helped the Soviet Union wage the Cold 
War had evolved over decades as part and parcel of the machinery 
of a police state. Created by the country's Bolshevik rulers, they 
were adapted by Stalin to suit to his particular brand of personal 
dictatorship. Both intelligence and counterintelligence served the 
primary purpose of securing internal control while protecting the 
regime against real or imaginary foreign infiltration and subversion. 
Domestic and foreign operations were intertwined with each other 
as well as with the apparatus of preventive repression throughout 
the Soviet Union and its Eastern European dependencies. In peace-
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time, there were no sharp lines between the military and political 
intelligence that was gathered, respectively, by the GRU and the 
super-agency known in its final incarnation as the KGB. 
In tbe golden days of communism, strong ideological dedication 
permeated all the intelligence personnel, generating an image of its 
nigh mystical capability and effectiveness. The Marxist ideology 
that inspired its thinking and motivated its action posited the 
existence of powerful and irreconcilable enemies, whose hostility re-
quired perpetual vigilance. In the extreme Stalinist conception, the 
intensity of the "class struggle" that had to be waged against those 
enemies was increasing rather than diminishing as the historically 
inevitable triumph of "socialism" was approaching. The Soviet 
Union's victory in World War II, which brought under its control 
largely hostile parts of Central and Eastern Europe, added to the 
importance of intelligence as the "fatherland of socialism" was 
heading toward a confrontation with the world's most powerful 
capitalist nation, the United States - a turn of events Stalin had 
neither wished nor anticipated. 
However, the exalted reputation of Soviet intelligence services 
was greatly exaggerated. Under Stalin, the pervasive atmosphere of 
fear that permeated his regime affected adversely the efficacy and 
value of intelligence operations, as it induced both the spies and 
the analysts to gather and report to their superiors mainly what the 
despot wanted to hear. For example, during his pact with Hitler, 
Stalin's propensity for appeasement discouraged the collection of 
intelligence when it was most needed to prepare for the impending 
German attack. Stalin's refusal to heed the abundant warnings he 
had nonetheless been receiving from different quarters prior to the 
June 1941 German invasion has gone down in history as a prime 
example of the irrelevance of intelligence if the will to act upon it 
is lacking. Conversely, Moscow's willingness to act at that time on 
intelligence reports from Tokyo that Hitler's Japanese ally would 
remain neutral made a major difference. The resulting strategic 
shift of the bulk of Soviet forces onto the German front probably 
saved the country from defeat. Such an important outcome of an 
intelligence feat, however, was much more likely to occur in war-
time than in peacetime. 
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Having learned from its mistakes, the Soviet Union subsequently 
achieved what may in retrospect be judged its greatest intelligence 
triumphs. By the end of the 1940s, its agents' penetration of 
Western governments had left hardly any secrets of any value out-
side its reach. The magnitude of this accomplishment, to be sure, 
was due not so much to the prowess of Soviet officers as to the 
extraordinary availability of well-placed Western sympathizers, 
typically disillusioned members of the upper classes, who were 
ready to commit treason for the sake of supposed communist 
ideals. 
The most notable result of this significant, but episodic, pheno-
menon was the acquisition by the Soviet Union of Western nuclear 
secrets, which allowed it to produce the atomic bomb sooner than 
it would have been able to do otherwise, and thereby emerge as 
a rival superpower to the United States. In the longer perspective, 
however, there was an air of futility about that accomplishment, 
as it generated unfounded assumptions about each side's aggres-
sive intentions, offered the dubious and costly rationale for strate-
gies of deterrence, and fueled the inconclusive arms race. Rather 
than providing solid foundations for great power status, nuclear 
weapons' most conspicuous and lasting legacy for Russia, as 
well as for other parts of the former Soviet Union, has been the 
contamination of large portions of territory with radioactive waste 
and the headache of having to protect the obsolete nuclear stock-
pile against illicit removal. 
More important than the acquisition of the dismal weapon was 
the Soviet ability to become privy to the West's most secret mi-
litary plans at a time when the possibility of a real war appeared 
most likely and, according to the Marxist-Leninist writ, inevitable. 
But since Stalin believed such a war could be delayed, perhaps 
indefinitely, his capacity to learn from his spies that a Western 
attack was not imminent was more important than anything else, 
especially in view of his susceptibility to miscalculation. This 
came again on display in 1950, when he finally gave his approval, 
after considerable hesitation, to the communist aggression in 
Korea on the erroneous assumption that the United States would 
not intervene. The error showed the limitations of even the best 
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intelligence in a rapidly changing situation. In fact, the United 
States had not been ready to intervene by the time the invasion 
was launched and even President Truman could not predict that 
his country's lack of readiness would subsequently be reversed. I 
In Stalin's last years, Soviet intelligence capabilities declined 
after his star spy, Kim Philby, had to be spirited away to 
Moscow to avoid exposure. The utility of information received 
suffered further from the officially fomented paranoia about 
enemy conspiracies. Evidence from Eastern European archives 
demonstrates that reports showing vast penetration by Western 
spies were not merely invented for public consumption to justify 
the repression of imaginary enemies, but were taken seriously by 
the security services as a working assumption. The results were 
sometimes bizarrely counterproductive. For example, it was 
Soviet intelligence that played into the hands of the Czechoslovak 
services bogus evidence about treasonable contacts of former party 
general secretary, Rudolf Sl;,nsky - evidence subsequently used to 
destroy him and other communist officials of impeccable loyalty 
to Moscow.' 
The Khrushchev Period 
After Stalin's death, the self-defeating distortions of Soviet 
intelligence due to the impact of his personality and style of 
governance lessened but never disappeared. They included build-
ing up the Eastern European secret services as extended arms of 
Moscow - a relationship bound to impair the quality of the infor-
mation received at the headquarters about the conditions in the 
countries from where, rather than from the West, the most serious 
threats to Soviet power in Europe were repeatedly emanating. 
Accordingly, the Kremlin was caught by surprise by the 1953 East 
Kathryn Weathershy, "'To Attack, or Not to Attack? Stalin, Kim II Sung, and the 
Prelude to War," Cold \lVar 11Ilernatiol1al History Project Bulletin, vol. .5 (1995): 
1-9. 
2 Igor LukeS, .. Dcr Fall Slansk5': Einc Exilorganisation unci dus Ende des 
tschechoslowakischcn Kommunisrcnflihrers 1952", Viertcliahrshe{te (iiT 
Zeitgeschichte, vol. 47 (1999): 459-501. 
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German uprising, the 1956 upheavals in Poland and Hungary, and 
all the subsequent crises in the region that ultimately proved fatal 
of the integrity of the Soviet empire. 
Under Khrushchev, the security services' repressive role de-
creased, but a sense of being vulnerable to penetration and sub-
version by Western intelligence persisted. This was evident in 
Khrushchev's resistance to any proposals for intrusive armanlents 
inspections, such as Eisenhower's "open skies" idea of mutual 
aerial surveillance of military installations. The reason for his op-
position was not so much a desire to cheat on weapons develop-
ment as concern about the effects of such an opening on the closed 
communist societies. After being the first to send an artificial satel-
lite around the Earth in 1968, Moscow accepted the principle of 
unimpeded surveillance of any territory from outer space. Bur the 
principle was to bring greater intelligence benefit to the West than 
to the East, for the United States soon assumed and always main-
tained the technological lead in aerial photography. 
The change of Moscow's military strategy in Europe from 
defensive to offensive during the second Berlin crisis of 1958-61 
was difficult to justify by NATO's allegedly aggressive plans. The 
Soviet intelligence was in a position to find out that these were in 
fact strictly defensive. To get around the contradiction, the supreme 
commander of the Warsaw Pact, Marshallvan S. Konev, offered its 
high-ranking officers a contorted, ideologically based explanation. 
He argued that since NATO based its defensive posture on the 
unfounded assumption that the "socialist" states were planning 
to attack, these must plan on the correct assumption that NATO, 
notwithstanding its actual position, would necessarily be the one 
to attack because of its capitalist nature. 3 
In taking high risks during the Berlin crisis, Khrushchev tend-
ed to rely more on intuition than on intelligence. Once Kennedy 
came to office, Soviet intelligence reported that the president was 
supposedly under pressure from his entourage to make conces-
-' Speech by Koncv at Czechoslovak army exercise, 31 March-7 April, 1959, in 
Voitech r..-lasrny and Malcolm Byrne (cd.), A G.1rdboard Castle? All I11side History ol 
the \\7arsaw Pact, 1955-1991 (Budapcst and New York: Central European University 
Press, 2005), pp. 97-99. 
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sions on Berlin.' Concluding that the new American leader was 
weak, Khrushchev was thus encouraged to play for high stakes. 
As he allowed the crisis to escalate, however, uncertainty about 
American reaction discouraged him from taking the crucial step 
of concluding a separate peace treaty with East Germany. In this 
respect, unintended Western transparency may have been a bles-
sing in disguise. 
Bv terminating the Western rights of access to Berlin, the treaty 
wo~ld have risked provoking a military response. Through ~ 
French traitor on the Allied committee that was planning for this 
contingency, the Soviet Union was in a position to know that the 
Western powers did not rule out the use of force, including a de-
monstrative high-altitude detonation of a nuclear bomb. Such 
knowledge inevitably increased the margin of uncertainty about 
Western intentions that eventually compelled Khrushchev to bring 
the crisis to an end. The Soviet intelligence coup thus had the 
perverse effect of making it more difficult for him to achieve in 
Germany the goal he had originally set himself to accomplish.5 
Nor did intelligence benefit Soviet - unlike American - policy 
during the 1962 confrontation over Cuba. When trying surrepti-
tiously to install nuclear missiles on the island, Khrushchev knew 
enough about what the Americans could do but not what they 
would do, for they themselves did not know until the discovery of 
the strategic missiles made them scramhle for a policy. The Excom 
deliberations, where the policy was being decided, remained 
secret, denying Khrushchev the benefit of crucial intelligence. The 
humiliating resolution of the crisis, which entailed the withdrawal 
of the missiles under US aerial surveillance, exposed the limita-
tions of the attempted Soviet concealment.' 
4 Vladislav ;,,,1. Zubok, "Unwrapping the Enigma: What Was Behind the Soviet 
Challenge in the 1960s?" in Diane H. Kunz (cd.). The Di/J/ol1lac), Df the Cruci,lI 
Decade: American Foreign Re/atiolls dllring the 1960s (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1994), pp. 149-82, at p. 153. 
5 Grcgory \'\T. Pcdlow, ... Allied Crisis Management for Berlin: The Live Oak 
Organization, 1959-]963," in William W. Eplcy (cd.), internatiollal Cold \\"ar 
lvlilitary Records and History: Proceedings of the Internatiollal ConferCllce 011 Cold 
\\"ar Mi!ilm")' Records (Jnd History Held ill Washingtoll, D.e, 21-26 March 1994 
(Washington: Office of the Secretary of Ddense, 1996), pp. 87-116. 
6 Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Nafrali, "The Pitsunda Decision: Khrushchev and 
Nuclear Weapons, n Cold W!ar Internatiollal Histoi}' Project BuIletill, \'01. 1 0 (~larch 
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This failure was partly offset hy Soviet success in concealing the 
removal from Cuba of tactical nuclear missiles, which the United 
States did not know about and whose existence only came to light 
after the end of the Cold War. Removing them undetected was 
essential so as to maintain the minimum of trust necessary for the 
improvement of US-Soviet relations, the most important result of 
which was the 1963 landmark Limited Test Ban Treaty. In this 
sense, its conclusion was a beneficial consequence of intelligence 
deception. 
Eastern European intelligence services, despite their dependence 
on the KGB and GRU, could occasionally perform important feats 
of their own. Polish intelligence agents did so by eavesdropping 
on Khrushchev's son-in-law Aleksei Adzhubei's wild indiscretions 
during his talks with high-ranking West German politicians while 
visiting the Federal Republic in 1964. Passing the incriminating 
evidence into the hands of the Kremlin conspirators bent on ous-
ting Khrushchev facilitated, though not caused, his downfall. It in-
fluenced Soviet power struggle rather than the course of the Cold 
War.' 
The Brezhnev Years 
Extending the Cold War into the Third World, which was initiated by 
Khrushchev and accelerated under his successors, vastly expanded 
the size of the Soviet intelligence agencies and their activities, both 
political and military. Eastern European and Cuban services were 
extensively involved. Their operatives usually adapted better to 
the local environments than did Russians, hampered by their racial 
prejudices. Czechoslovakia played a prominent role until 1968, 
after which it never enjoyed enough Soviet confidence to reemerge 
as an important player. East Germany then became Moscow's most 
1998): 223-27. James H. Hansen, "Soviet Deception in the Cuban Mi5.sile Crisis.'" 
Studies lit Intelligence, vol. 46, no. 1 (2002): 49-58. Cf. James G. Blight, and David 
A. Welch, cds., Intelligellce and the Cuban Missile Crisis (London: Cass, 1998), and 
Raymond L. Ganhoff, "'US Intelligence in the Cuban lvlissile Crisis," intelligence 1.111d 
National Security 13, no. 3 (Autumn 1998): 46-47, 50-51. 
7 Douglas Selvage, "'Poland and the Sino-Soviet Rift~ 1963-] 965", Cold War 
III/ema/iollal His/ory Pro/ec(e-DossierSeries, no. 10 (Wood row Wilson 
International Center for Scholars [online 9 Aug 1006J). 
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valuable subsidiary in foreign covert and overt operations. 
The record of Soviet intelligence in unfamiliar parts of the 
world with alien political cultures was decidedly mixed. For rea-
sons still not entirely clear, in 1967 Soviet intelligence passed 
false information onto Egypt about an imminent Israeli attack 
on Syria, thus precipitating Egyptian preparations for an attack. 
These in turn prompted Israeli pre-emption and the spectacular 
defeat of Moscow's Arab clients in the Six-Day War. Afterwards 
the Soviet Union never regained enough control over them to be 
able to reliably manipulate them for its purposes. Instead, they be-
came more adept at manipulating the Soviet Union to serve their 
purposes by having it assume risks it would have otherwise prefer-
red to avoid.' 
The Soviet miscalculations attending the IJ1vaSlOn of 
Czechoslovakia in 1968 attested to shortcomings of Moscow's 
intelligence in its own backyard. Its dependence on reporting by 
second-rate diplomats and party officials led to underestimating 
the extent of local revulsion against the intervention, forcing the 
Kremlin to compromise with the very leadership it had intended to 
depose. At the same time, though accurately inforlJ1eu that NATO 
was not preparing to move, the Soviet command was taking ex-
cessive precautions. The invading forces were instructed to avoid 
hostile contact with Western troops in the improbable event that 
NATO would choose to enter the fray - a political decision not 
supported by the available intelligence." 
By lowering the barriers separating the East and West, detente 
made the gathering of intelligence easier but also less necessary. 
Since intelligence activities, fueled especially by the continuing 
arms race, nevertheless proceeded apace they often did more 
harm than good to their taskmasters. The discovery in 1974 of 
an East German spy in the office of West Germany's chancellor, 
Willy Brandt, forced the resignation of a politician favored by the 
8 Alcksandr 5humilin, "Za kulisami 'shcsridncvlloi voiny'" [Behind tbe Scenes of 
the "Six-Day War"], NOt/oc L'rel1li<11992, no. 37: 22-24; Georgii [\'1. Kornienko, 
"Kholodllaia l'oilll1": SIJidetclst/!o ec lfchastllika [The "Cold \X!ar": A Testimonv by Its 
Participant] (Moscow: Olma-Press, 20(H), p. 169. . . 
9 Vikror Suvorov, Ost'oboditel [TIle Liberator] (St. Pctcrsburg: Konet5 veb, 1993), pp. 
175-76. 
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Soviets, whom they had very much wanted to stay in power. Simi-
larly counterproductive were the operations of Soviet submarines 
in Swedish waters. They undermined Moscow's efforts to cultivate 
the goodwill of Europe's leading neutral nation, especially after 
one of the intruding vessels gave itself away by running aground. 
The massive penetration by East German spies of not only 
the West German government but also NATO headquarters was 
a tribute to their proficiency. Largely thanks to them, Moscow 
continued to receive reassuring information about NATO's militarv 
planning as well as the chronic discord within the alliance. Th~ 
United States' defeat in Vietnam added to the good news, while 
the Sino-American rapprochement did not significantly detract 
from it. In any case, the Brezhnev leadership reached the upbeat, 
if false, conclusion that the global "correlation of forces" was mov-
ing irreversibly the Soviet way. 
In view of this mistaken assumption, the value of what could 
be learned from the all but unlimited access to the enemy's se-
crets was, ironically, quite limited. Intelligence could not give 
the leaders a satisfactory explanation of why, contrary to their 
expectations, detente started deteriorating by the middle of the 
nineteen-seventies. The Kremlin refused to admit that its own co-
vert and overt anti-Western operations on behalf of Third World 
"liberation movements" might be at fault for having undermined 
the detente it wanted to preserve. In fact, these activities gave out-
siders the impression that the Soviet Union was more involved than 
was actually the case. In Africa, in particular, its hand was often 
blamed for what the Cubans were doing on their own initiative. 10 
Clandestine liaisons established with leftist regimes in places of no 
vital Soviet interest, such as Nicaragua and Grenada, just because 
an opportunity to do so had offered itself, damaged Moscow's real 
interests. 
The KGB bore a large degree of responsibility for the disastrous 
decision to invade Afghanistan in 1979. Choosing to meddle in 
messy Afghan politics, the Kremlin found itself in a situation it 
was unable to control. The increasingly arbitrary behavior of its 
10 Piero Gieiiescs, Conflicting Missio1ls: ]-hll'mra, W/ashillgtoll, ill1d Africa, 1959-1976 
(Chapcll-Iill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), pp. 364-72. 
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onetime protege, Hafizullah Amin, prompted KGB agents in the 
country to send to Moscow unfounded reports that the Americans 
were masterminding his actions. The reports were off the mark in 
that they exaggerated Washington's willingness, not to mention 
ability, to use the Afghan politician but were what the bellicose 
clique within the politburo that was looking for a pretext for an 
intervention wanted to hear.ll 
Prominent within that clique was KGB chief Yuri Andropov, 
by virtue of his office the best-informed person in the state, yet 
evidently not the wisest. During the crisis in Poland that soon fol-
lowed, however, he acted as if he had learned a lesson. Under no 
illusions about the country's true situation and the prohibitive cost 
of a Soviet military intervention there, he emerged as the polit-
buro's leading voice opposed to that course of action under any 
circumstances. Soviet intelligence agents assessed accurately the 
relative integrity of the Polish army, whose high command, under 
Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski, eventually imposed martial law on its 
own initiative, thus giving communism in Poland a lease on life 
for a few more years. '2 
The head of the KGB understood the Polish situation better than 
he did the reasons behind the anti-Soviet turn in US policy under the 
Reagan administration. To the Eastern European allies, Andropov 
characterized the change as a response to the Soviet Union's at-
tainment of strategic parity, the West's political losses in the Third 
World, and the capitalist system's progressing crisis. Consistent with 
the Marxist notion that the cornered capitalists would be tempted 
to find a way out of their predicament by unleashing war, he ordered 
operation RYAN - a worldwide watch by his agents for any signs of 
an impending surprise attack. Ll 
11 Vasiliy Mitrokhin~ The KGB ill Afghanistall, CWIHP working paper, no. 40 
(Washington: Woodrow Wilson International Ccmer for Scholars1 2001). 
12 IVlark Kramer (cd.), SOl'/et Deliberations during the Polish Crisis, 1980-/981, 
CWIHP special working paper no. 1 (Washington: Woodrow Wilson International 
Centcr for Scholars, 1999). 
13 Speech by Andropov, 4-5 January 1983, in Masrny and Byrne, A Cardboard 
Castlcf. pp. 472-70; Benjamin B. Fischer, A Cold W'ar COllundrum: The 1983 
SOL'let War Scare {Washington: Centra! Intelligence Agency, 1997). 
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From Andropov to Gorbachev 
After having succeeded Brezhnev as the party general secretary, 
Andropov's forebodings tended to be substantiated by incidents 
suggestive of a Western readiness to launch the dreaded attack. Be-
sides Reagan's slip of tongue in front of an open microphone, the 
episodes included especially NATO's "Able Archer" exercise of 
November 1983 that simulated the release of nuclear missiles while 
concealing their parameters by encryption. The incident happened 
amid an officially fomented Soviet war scare; nevertheless, it did 
not prompt any notable precautionary, much less pre-emptive, ac-
tion. 
Retrospectively, East German intelligence officers have been clai-
ming credit for saving peace by supplying their Moscow superiors 
with evidence of NATO's peaceful intentions. In fact, none of the 
records the officers had chosen to save to burnish their image for 
posterity offers supporting evidence; they all portrayed NATO's 
intentions as aggressive. More to the point, there was no alarm 
in the Soviet general staff. It is likely, though difficult to prove, 
that the varions alarming incidents that were taking place, such 
as when signs of what could be read as incoming enemy missiles 
appeared on the monitoring screens, were reported by intelligence 
personnel with so many caveats that the men at the top never had 
to face agonizing decisions. 14 
If this was the case, it was a tribute to common sense raking 
hold within the communist intelligence services in the late stages 
of the Cold War. Unlike before, the services tended to attract 
the brightest and best, exposing them extensively to the Western 
environment, where they could form a realistic, rather than an 
ideologically colored, view of the other side. Symptomatic of the 
change was the growing number of operatives defecting from the 
14 Bcrnd Schaefcr, The Warsaw Pact's I11telligellce 011 NATO: East German Military 
Espionage Against the \1;'est, IFS Info No. 2/2002 (Os[o: Institute for Defence 
Studies, 1002). Vojtcch Mastn)', "'Did East German Spies Prevent a Nuclear War?" 
Parallel History Project 011 NATO and the Warsaw Pact (PHP) (Swis~ Federal 
Institute of TcchooJogy Zurich /online 8 Aug 2006]). On the lack of concern by the 
general staff, testimony by Col. Vitali! N. Tsygichko at the oral bistory roundtable, 
"Military Planning for European Theatre Conflict during the Cold War," 
Stockholm, 24-25 April 2006. 
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East to the West rather than in the opposite direction, as had been 
the case in the earlier days when communism, rather than demo-
cracy, appeared ro be the wave of the future. 
The disillusionment and diminishing ideological commitment of 
Soviet elites, among whom intelligence personnel figured promi-
nently, were one of the notable achievements of the otherwise am-
bivalent East-West detente. Its decline in the early 1980s did not 
reverse that process, facilitating the emergence of "new thinking" 
under Gorbachev. Rather than fomenting communist militancy, the 
West's political and economic ascendancy nourished doubts about 
the adequacy of the Soviet system, thus preparing the ground for 
the eventual abdication of power by its guardians that made the 
peaceful ending of the Cold War possible. 
Intelligence findings could inadvertently be helpful in promo-
ting the process. For example, the draft of West German "Defense 
Policy Guidelines," acquired by East Gennan agents, assumed 
that European stability would be maintained because of the Soviet 
system's basic continuity, that the superpowers' offensive weap-
ons would help maintain a strategic balance, and that NATO 
could not sway the balance regardless of its acquisition of high-
technology conventional weapons. Although all these assumptions 
were wrong, knowing that the adversary believed they were right 
made the relaxation of the Warsaw Pact's military posture more 
affordable. It made even such hardliner as East Germany's Erich 
Honecker support Gorbachev's initial efforts to reduce the military 
confrontation in Central Europe." 
In the end, events were moving so fast that even the KGB's 
greatest achievements during the Cold War's final years - from 
the penetration of rop US military secrets thanks to the greed of 
individual CIA officials willing ro sell themselves to the snatching 
of technological secrets thanks ro employees susceptible to bribes 
- mattered little ro the final outcome. In the remarkably tran-
sparent denouement of the Cold War, the intelligence services, 
built on secrecy, were notable for their absence. Their irrelevance 
in the high drama of the Soviet collapse serves as a reminder of 
15 Excerpts from "Vcneidigungspolitische Richtlinicn", April 1987, AZN 32651, pp. 
78-86, Bundcs;1.fChiv-!V[i1itamrchiv, Freiburg. 
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the limitations of the role of intelligence within the larger picture 
of history. 
Though an integral parr of the Cold War, intelligence was by no 
means the determining one. This was particularly true on the Soviet 
side despite the prominence of the profession and its practitioners 
within the Soviet system. At no time did the deeds and misdeeds 
of its operatives bring about accomplishments or failures liable 
to alter the course of the Cold War. Of scant relevance in major 
crises, Soviet intelligence mattered more on other occasions, when 
it made outcomes somewhat better or somewhat worse but not 
substantially different from what they would otherwise have been. 
In the end, the Soviet system collapsed under its own weight, re-
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Did intelligence matter in the Cold War? 
For forty years the superpower conflict between the 
United States and the Soviet Union dominated the 
world stage. In popular culture the conflict produced 
a plethora of "spy" books and fihns about the daring 
exploits of intelligence agents. In contrast, the 
scholarly investigation of the role of intelligence in 
the Cold War had to await the gradual opening, since 
1990, of "Top Secret" archives. It is now time to 
make a first attempt at assessing the role that 
intelligence played in the overall development of the 
conflict. Did intelligence help to avoid the Cold War 
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